Administrative Law -- Natural Gas Regulation: FERC Must Consider Actual Impact of Curtailment Plans by Kirkman, Donald A.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 57 | Number 2 Article 6
2-1-1979
Administrative Law -- Natural Gas Regulation:
FERC Must Consider Actual Impact of
Curtailment Plans
Donald A. Kirkman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donald A. Kirkman, Administrative Law -- Natural Gas Regulation: FERC Must Consider Actual Impact of Curtailment Plans, 57 N.C. L.
Rev. 287 (1979).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol57/iss2/6
NOTES
Administrative Law-Natural Gas Regulation: FERC Must
Consider Actuall Impact of Curtailment Plans
Since the beginning of the current shortage of natural gas,' the
Federal Power Commission (FPC and now the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (FERC))2 has regulated not only the price of natural
gas sold in interstate commerce, but also the allocation of scarce sup-
plies of interstate gas.3 The Commission has not allocated interstate
1. See M. WILLRICH, ADMINISTRATION OF ENERGY SHORTAGES 11-14 (1976) for a statisti-
cal description of the shortage. For a discussion of the causes of the shortage, see Harrison &
Formby, Regional Distortions in Natural Gas Allocations: 4 Legal and Economic Anaysis, 57
N.C.L. REv. 57 (1978). In the last year or so, however, the shortage has abated somewhat, as
industrial users have switched to other fuels, and as additions to reserves, prompted by higher
prices for new discoveries, have increased. Berry, Whatever Happened to that Shortage of Natural
Gas?, FORBES, Sept. 4, 1978, at 32. Gas is still less plentiful on the interstate market than on the
intrastate market though, since most of the new gas was intended for the intrastate markets in
which prices are not controlled. Id. at 33.
2. The Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977), trans-
ferred most of the Federal Power Commission's duties in administering the Natural Gas Act to
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
3. A brief description of the structure and operation of the natural gas industry is helpful.
The process by which natural gas comes from the ground to the consumer's burner tip is divided
into three stages: production, transmission, and local distribution. Producers in the fields sell gas
to pipelines according to long-term contracts. Interstate pipelines then transmit the gas to various
parts of the country and sell most of it to local distributors, who, in turn, deliver and sell the gas to
ultimate consumers. See Harrison & Formby, supra note 1, at 59-62. About 10% of interstate
pipeline sales, however, are made directly from pipelines to ultimate industrial consumers. M.
WILLRICH, supra note 1, at 19. Depending on "the density of population and the industrial struc-
ture of regional economies," some areas are served by two or more pipelines, while others are
entirely dependent on a single pipeline. Harrison & Formby, supra, at 60.
The scope of the Commission's jurisdiction over the natural gas industry is defined by § 1(b)
of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976):
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in
interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ulti-
mate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to
natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any
other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to
the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.
Id. § 1(c), 15 U.S.C. § 717(c), expressly limiting the Commission's jurisdiction, provides in
part:
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person engaged in or legally
authorized to engage in the transportation in interstate commerce or the sale in interstate
commerce for resale, of natural gas received by such person from another person within
or at the boundary of a State if all the natural gas so received is ultimately consumed
within such State, or to any facilities used by such person for such transportation or sale,
provided that the rates and service of such person and facilities be subject to regulation
by a State commission. The matters exempted from the provisions of this Chapter by
this subsection are declared to be matters piimarily of local concern and subject to regu-
lation by the several States.
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gas on a nationwide basis, but has chosen instead to treat each inter-
state pipeline as a separate unit,4 and to regulate the distribution of
each pipeline's supplies through the use of "curtailment plans"5 filed by
the pipeline and approved by the FPC. Since 1973, the Commission
has followed a policy of favoring "end-use" curtailment plans, which
allocate each pipeline's supplies according to priorities based on the
ultimate or end use to which the gas is put.6 The implementation of
The FPC's regulation of natural gas allocation was begun by Order No. 431, 45 F.P.C. 570
(1971), entitled "Policy with Respect to Establishment of Measures to Be Taken for the Protection
of as Reliable and Adequate Service as Present Natural Gas Supplies and Capacities Will
Permit."
4. Harrison & Formby, supra note 1, at 82.
5. A "curtailment plan" is a scheme for allocating a pipeline's supply of natural gas during
times of shortage. Despite the prospect of increased supplies presented by recently enacted legis-
lation that "deregulates" prices of newly discovered natural gas, shortages, and the accompanying
need for curtailment plans, are not likely to disappear altogether.
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350, printedin [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws No. 12, passed by the Senate on September 27, 1978, 124 CONG. REc.
S16,265 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978), and by the House on October 14, 1978, 124 CONG. REc.
H13,427 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978), will no doubt increase the supply of natural gas available to the
interstate market. Prior to the 1978 Act the price of gas sold for ultimate use in the same state
where it was produced (intrastate gas) was not subject to federal regulation, as is the price of gas
produced for use in other states (interstate gas). See Natural Gas Act, § 1(b), (c), 15 U.S.C. §
717(b), (c) (1976); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954) (upholding Commis-
sion's authority to regulate wellhead prices of gas intended for sale in interstate commerce). Ac-
cordingly, producers were reluctant to invest the large sums of money necessary to develop new,
more expensive, sources of gas, and the new gas that was produced was sold in the intrastate
market. Moring & Wilderotter, Natural Gas: The Policy-Pricing Matrix, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INsT. 737, 748 (1977). The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, however, extends federal price regula-
tion to intrastate gas, and then gradually eliminates price controls on newly discovered gas, both
intrastate and interstate, allowing full price deregulation in 1985. 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
2615-16 (1978). The prospect of higher prices for producers should encourage exploitation of new,
less easily tapped sources of gas.
Just how much additional gas production the new legislation will induce remains to be seen.
Estimates by the administration and independent analysts vary widely. Hunt, Senate Approves
Natural Gas Bill, 57-42, to Rescind New-Find Controls by '85, Regulate Intrastate Prices, Wall St.
J., Sept. 28, 1978, at 2, coL 2. The burdensome complexity of the new bill's regulatory scheme
may discourage some producers from attempting to find new gas. Sheils, Will the Gas BillHep?,
NEwsWEEK, Oct. 2, 1978, at 103. In any event, full deregulation of the prices of most newly
discovered gas will not come until 1985. In the interim, supplies may remain sufficiently low to
require curtailment. That the bill's authors foresaw the possibility of continued shortages is indi-
cated by the Act's provision in title III for special presidential authority during natural gas emer-
gencies, and in title IV for the establishment of certain curtailment priorities. See note 92 infra.
6. See North Carolina v. FERC, 584 F.2d 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Theoretically, as the
pipeline's supply decreases, service to successively higher-priority uses is curtailed. Id. Curtail-
ment into a given priority category does not begin until service to all lower categories has been
completely curtailed. Id. at 1008.
The Commission's ability to ensure that curtailment of service to ultimate users actually pro-
ceeds in conformity with the priorities set forth in an end-use plan, however, is significantly cir-
cumscribed by the limitations on the Commission's jurisdiction. Since its jurisdiction extends only
to the sale and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, see 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976),
quotedin note 3 supra, the Commission has no authority to regulate the allocation of gas by local
distributors to ultimate or end users. M. WELLRICH, supra note I, at 46-47. Instead, the Commis-
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end-use curtailment plans on a strictly pipeline-by-pipeline basis has
caused much more severe curtailment in some regions (most notably
the Southeast, and North Carolina and South Carolina in particular)
than in others.7 In North Carolina v. FERC, however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit deter-
mined that two major features of an end-use curtailment plan were de-
fective because they tended to result in regionally discriminatory
allocation and because they rendered an accurate assessment of the
plan's actual impact impossible.9 The court held that in drawing the
curtailment plans the Commission must determine and consider the ac-
tual impact of the plans on ultimate consumers. 10 To assess a plan's
actual impact, the Commission must collect and consider information
about recent changes in the end uses to which gas supplied to the pipe-
line's customers" is put by ultimate consumers 12 and in the relative
supplies available to each customer from other pipelines.1 3 This deci-
sion may mean that in the future, supplies of natural gas will be more
sion's curtailment plans control only the allocation of gas from interstate pipelines to their imme-
diate customers-either local distributors or industrial users who purchase directly from the
pipeline. Id. Except in the case of directly purchasing end users, then, the "end-use" character of
an end-use curtailment plan lies not in the actual control of the use of gas at the burner tip, but in
the allocation of the pipeline's supply to local distributors according to each distributor's "end-use
profile" or "mix" of end uses to which gas purchased by the distributor's customers was put during
some base period. See 584 F.2d at 1007. There is no guarantee, however, that the state agencies
that regulate local distribution will follow the priorities set forth in a curtailment plan ordered into
effect by the Commission. M. WILLRICH, supra, at 46-47.
A "pro rata," in contrast to end-use, curtailment plan, allocates the pipeline's supply accord-
ing to the contractual entitlements of each of the pipeline's customers. 584 F.2d at 1007. The
amount of gas for which each customer has contracted is reduced by the same percentage as that
by which the supplies of the entire pipeline system have been reduced.
The Commission announced its preference for end-use curtailment plans in Order No. 467,
38 Fed. Reg. 1503 (1973) (partially codified as amended at 18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1977)). For a discus-
sion of the order, see notes 34-36 and accompanying tdxt infra.
7. Harrison & Formby, supra note 1, at 85-86.
8. 584 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
9. Id. at 1012-14, 1014 n.22; North Carolina v. FERC, No. 76-2102 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29,
1978) (order amending opinion of July 13, 1978, by adding footnote 20). The court's order of Aug.
29, 1978, amended North Carolina v. FERC, No. 76-2102 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 1978) by ordering
the addition of new footnote 20 on page 21 of the slip opinion and renumbering old footnotes 20-
34 as 21-35. The slip opinion was reprinted in 584 F.2d at 1003 prior to this renumbering. In this
Note citations to North Carolina v. FERC notes 20-34 reprinted in 584 F.2d are to the notes as
designated before renumbering. New note 20 is hereinafter cited as Slip op. at 21 n.20 (as
amended Aug. 29, 1978).
10. 584 F.2d at 1015.
11. Throughout this Note, the term "customer," unless otherwise indicated, is intended to
refer either to local distributors or to industrial end-users who purchase their gas directly from an
interstate pipeline.
12. Slip op. at 21 n.20 (as amended Aug. 29, 1978).
13. 584 F.2d at 1013-15.
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evenly allocated among the various regions of the country than at pres-
ent. Nevertheless, regional distortions are likely to remain.
North Carolina v. FERC arose when certain customers of Trans-
continental Pipe Line Corporation (Transco)14 sought judicial review
of a permanent curtailment plan for the Transco system ordered into
effect by FPC Opinion No. 778.15 Opinion 778 established nine prior-
ity categories of end use, ranging from residential and small commer-
cial use (first in priority and last to be curtailed) to use of large amounts
of gas as boiler fuel (last in priority and first to be curtailed). 16 The
14. Transco buys natural gas from producers in the Gulf states and transmits it by pipeline to
customers in Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Penn-
sylvania, New Jersey, and New York. All but one of Transco's customers "are wholesale custom-
ers-public utilities and municipalities which purchase the gas for resale to ultimate customers."
Id. at 1008. As a company engaged in the transportation and sale for resale of gas in interstate
commerce, Transco is subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under § l(b) of the Natural
Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976), quoted in note 3 SUpra.
15. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., Opinion No. 778, 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) 5-
1045 (1976). Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., Opinion No. 778-A, 11 FED. POWER SERV.
(M-B) 5-177 (1976), made only slight modifications to Opinion No. 778.
The proceedings leading to Opinion 778 began in 1971 when, in response to growing
shortages and to FPC Order No. 431, 45 F.P.C. 570 (1971), Transco filed a permanent curtailment
plan with the FPC. 584 F.2d at 1009. Following the Commission's direction, Transco filed an-
other permanent plan in 1973 that was consistent with the end-use guideline set forth in FPC
Order No. 467, 49 F.P.C. 85 (1973). 584 F.2d at 1009. Final decision on a permanent plan was
delayed for several years, however. During the intervening period the short supplies of Transco's
system were distributed according to a series of interim settlement agreements arrived at by nego-
tiation among Transco and its customers, and either approved by the FPC or ordered into effect
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id at 1008. The first two interim
settlement agreements were based on pro rata curtailment, the third on 50% pro rata and 50% end-
use curtailment, and the fourth and final on an end-use plan with two priority categories. Id. at
1008-09.
16. The priority categories set forth in Opinion 778 are:
(1) Residential and small commercial requirements less than 50 Mcf on a peak day.
(2) Large commercial requirements of 50 Mcf or more on a peak day, except for com-
mercial boiler fuel requirements above 300 Mcf/d; industrial requirement for plant pro-
tection, feedstock and process needs; and storage injection requirements.
(3) All other industrial requirements below 300 Mcf/d.
(4) Industrial requirements not specified in (2) (6) (7) (8) and (9) of more than 300
Mcf/d but less than 3000 Mcf/d.
(5) Industrial requirements not specified in (2) (6) (7) (8) and (9) of more than 3000
Mcf/d.
(6) Boiler fuel requirements of more than 300 Mcf/d but less than 1500 Mcf/d.
(7) Boiler fuel requirements of 1500 Mcf/d or more but less than 3000 Mcf/d.
(8) Boiler fuel requirements of 3000 Mcf/d or more but less than 10,000 Mcf/d.
(9) Boiler fuel requirements of 10,000 Mcf/d or more.
10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1091 n.63. "Mcf/d" means one thousand cubic feet per day.
Opinion 778 defined "process," "feedstock," and "plant protection" as follows:
Process refers to those industrial uses for which alternate fuels are not technically feasi-
ble. In general, this means those uses requiring the precise temperature controls and
flame characteristics of gas (including propane and other gaseous fuels). Feedstock re-
fers to the industrial use of gas as a raw material, that is, for its chemical not thermal,
properties. Plant protection refers to the industrial use of gas needed to prevent physical
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amount of gas available to each resale distributor is determined by the
"end-use profile" or "mix" of end uses to which gas purchased by the
distributor's customers is put. 7 This proffle is, however, not derived
from current uses, but rather from customer uses during the "base pe-
riod," May 1, 1972, through April 30, 1973.18 According to the plan,
Transco customers who are served by one or more other pipelines are
allocated an amount of gas for each of their priority uses that is propor-
tionately equal to the amount of gas supplied to them by Transco out of
their total supply during the base period.19 In other words, if local dis-
tributor Company A received 40% of its total supply from Transco and
60% from another pipeline during 1972-1973, 40% of each of Company
A's priorities would be assigned to Transco.z' Thus, if at some point in
the future the available supply on the Transco system were sufficient to
allow service to only the first three priorities, Company A would be
entitled to receive from Transco 40% of its requirements for those three
priorities.2'
The primary issue before the court of appeals in North Carolina v.
FERC was whether the plan ordered into effect by Opinion 778 re-
sulted in undue or unreasonable discrimination against certain locali-
ties or classes of service, thereby violating section 4(b) of the Natural
harm to plant facilities and/or danger to plant personnel, but it is limited to protection
which cannot be attained through the use of alternate fuels (again propane and other
gaseous fuels are not considered alternate fuels).
Id. at 5-1084. Use of gas for "boiler fuel" "[is] considered to be natural gas used as a fuel for the
generation of steam or electricity, including utilization of gas turbines for the generation of elec-
tricity." 18 C.F.IR § 2.78 (1977).
17. 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1067. The court in North Carolina v. FERC explained
this feature of an end-use plan as follows:
mhe extent to which a pipeline's distributor customers are curtailed depends on the
"mix" of each distributor's own customers. Distributors who have a large percentage of
high priority customers theoretically will not be curtailed as deeply as those who have a
small percentage ofsuch customers, and distributors who have a large percentage of low
priority customers will be curtailed more sharply than those who have a small percentage
of such customers.
584 F.2d at 1007.
18. 10 FED. POwER SERv. (M-B) at 5-1067.
19. See 584 F.2d at 1010, 1013-14.
20. See id.
21. Two additional elements of Opinion 778 should be noted. First, the Commission refused
to consider the merits of a provision by which those customers curtailed less than the average level
of curtailment for the Transco system would pay monetary compensation to those customers cur-
tailed more than the average level. 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1073, 5-1103. The Commis-
sion maintained that it had no authority to enforce such a provision. Id. at 5-1103; see 584 F.2d at
1015-16. Second, Opinion 778 included an "emergency high priority exemption from curtail-
ment," available to distributors under certain conditions. 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1093
to 94.
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Gas Act.22 Since the record demonstrated that the plan wrought re-
gionally discriminatory results,23 the legality of Opinion 778 depended
on whether there was sufficient justification for those results.24 Declar-
ing that the "discrimination resulting from an end-use plan can be jus-
tified only to the extent that the plan actually does protect high-priority
usesfrom curtailment aheadof low-priority uses," the court held that the
plan adopted in Opinion 778 could not be said to be just and reason-
able, "in light of the Commission'sfailure to make findings as to the im-
pact the plan would actualy have on ultimate consumers. '2 5 According
to the court, two features of the plan precluded an accurate assessment
of the plan's impact: first, the end-use data on which the plan was based
was approximately six years old, 6 and second, the plan failed to take
into account the "partial/full requirements phenomenon' ' 27 a situa-
tion resulting from the fact that some of Transco's customers ("partial-
requirements customers") are served by one or more additional pipe-
lines that have experienced considerably less severe shortages than
Transco in the years since the 1972-1973 base period, while those cus-
tomers ("full-requirements customers") supplied exclusively by
Transco have borne the full weight of the Transco system's deep
curtailment.28
22. 584 F.2d at 1010-12. Section 4(b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(b)(1976)
provides:
No natural-gas company shall, with respect to any transportation or sale of natural
gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or grant any undue prefer-
ence or advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disad-
vantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, facilities,
or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes of service.
23. The court stated:
A study showed that if an Opinion 778-type plan had been implemented in 1974-1975 it
would have resulted in levels of curtailment among Transco's distributors ranging from
9.6% to 39.5% on a state-by-state basis ... . On a regional basis, curtailment levels
would have ranged from 20.3% in the Northeast [District of Columbia, Maryland, Dela-
ware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York] to 38.4% in the Southeast [South Carolina,
North Carolina, Virginia]....
584 F.2d at 1011 (footnote omitted).
In the 1976-1977 heating season, during which the Opinion 778 plan was in effect on the
Transco system, regional distortions were pronounced. Curtailment of total natural gas require-
ments was at the level of 66.9% in South Carolina and 52.9% in North Carolina, while the cor-
responding figures for New York and Pennsylvania were 9.5% and 11.9%. Harrison & Formby,
su.pra note 1, at 84.
24. 584 F.2d at 1012.
25. Id. (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 1012-13.
27. Id. at 1013-14, 1014 n.22.
28. The court did not vacate Opinion 778. Instead, it allowed the Opinion 778 plan to re-
main in effect on a temporary basis until the Commission has had a reasonable time to consider
the issues remanded to it by the court of appeals. Id. at 1017.
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Development of the FPC's policies of curtailment began in 1971
with the promulgation of Order No. 43 1,2 9 directing pipelines expecting
shortages during the upcoming winter to submit curtailment plans to
the Commission. Judicial approval of the FPC's authority to regulate
curtailment by interstate pipelines came soon thereafter in FPC v. Loui-
siana Power & Light Co. ,30 in which the Supreme Court held that the
Commission's power over curtailment derives from its jurisdiction over
the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce.3 1 The Court
went on to say that the Commission must have broad powers over cur-
tailment programs in order to carry out the duties associated with its
jurisdiction over transportation of interstate gas.3 2  The standard by
which curtailment plans are to be evaluated, the Court said, is section
4(b) of the Natural Gas Act.33
Its power to regulate curtailment thus established, the Commission
proceeded to formulate a policy, announced in Order No. 467, of favor-
ing curtailment plans based on end use rather than on contractual enti-
tlements.' The major premise behind Order No. 467 (and behind all
Additionally, the court ordered the Commission to consider the inclusion of a compensation
feature in the permanent plan. Id. Despite the Commission's contention to the contrary, the court
expressly held that the Commission does have the power to order, as part of a curtailment plan,
that those customers whose services are curtailed less than the system-wide average compensate
those whose services are curtailed more than the system-wide average. Id. at 1015-17.
29. 45 F.P.C. 570 (1971).
30. 406 U.S. 621 (1972).
31. Id. at 636-41.
32. Id. at 642.
33. Id. at 642-43. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. also included a discussion of the
procedures available to the Commission for implementing curtailment plans. Id. at 643-45. As
the Court pointed out, the Commission could have chosen to proceed in accordance with § 5(a) of
the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1976), which authorizes the Commission to establish on
its own initiative "the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice or
contract to be thereafter observed and in force," after the Commission has held a hearing and has
determined that the existing rate, charge, classification, etc. is "unjust, unreasonable, unduly dis-
criminatory, or preferential." Since hearings can be lengthy, the use of § 5(a) for curtailment
proceedings can be cumbersome. Consequently, the Court approved the FPC's decision to pro-
ceed under § 4(c)-(e) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(c)-(e) (1976). Under § 4, a pipeline submits its
own curtailment plan which can be accepted immediately or suspended for as long as five months
pending hearings. The burden of proving the reasonableness and fairness of the plan is on the
pipeline. See M. WILLIUCH, supra note I, at 49-54.
34. 38 Fed. Reg. 1503 (1973) (partially codified as amended at 18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1977)). Or-
der No. 467-A, 38 Fed. Reg. 2170 (1973) (partially codified as amended at 18 C.F.R. § 2.78
(1972)), added to Order No. 467 a paragraph directing pipelines to include in their curtailment
plans provisions under which pipelines could "respond to emergency situations (including envi-
ronmental emergencies) during periods of curtailment where supplemental deliveries are required
to forestall irreparable injury to life or property." Id. Order No. 467-B, 38 Fed. Reg. 6384 (1973)
(partially codified as amended at 18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1977)), amended the list of priority classifica-
tions set forth in Order 467. Order No. 467-C, 39 Fed. Reg. 12984 (1974) (partially codified at 18
C.F.R. § 2.78 (1977)), added a section setting forth the minimal information required in a petition
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end-use curtailment plans) is that in times of shortage the supply of gas
should be allocated according to a hierarchy of priorities." The priori-
ties set forth in Order 467 represent the Commission's attempt to en-
sure the safety of residential and small commercial customers and to
prevent gas from being put to inefficient uses or to uses for which alter-
nate fuels could be substituted relatively easily.3 6
Not long after the promulgation of Order No. 467 the FPC indi-
cated a further preference for "fixed-base periods" over "rolling-base
for relief from curtailment. Unless otherwise indicated, all of the above orders will hereinafter be
referred to collectively as Order No. 467.
The priority categories set forth in Order No. 467-B were:
(1) Residential, small commercial (less than 50 Mcf on a peak day).
(2) Large commercial requirements (50 Mcf or more on a peak day), firm industrial
requirements for plant protection, feedstock and process needs, and pipeline customer
storage injection requirements.
(3) All industrial requirements not specified in paragraph (a) (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), or
(9) of this section.
(4) Firm industrial requirements for boiler fuel use at less than 3,000 Mcf per day, but
more than 1,500 Mcf per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such
requirements.
(5) Firm industrial requirements for large volume (3,000 Mcf or more per day) boiler
fuel use where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(6) Interruptible requirements of more than 300 Mcf per day, but less than 1,500 Mcf
per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(7) Interruptible requirements of intermediate volumes (from 1,500 Mcf per day
through 3,000 Mcf per day), where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such
requirements.
(8) Interruptible requirements of more than 3,000 Mcf per day, but less than 10,000
Mcf per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(9) Interruptible requirements of more than 10,000 Mcf per day, where alternate fuel
capabilities can meet such requirements.
Order No. 467-B, 38 Fed. Reg. 6384, 6386 (1973).
"Firm" service is "[s]ervice from schedules or contracts under which seller is expressly obli-
gated to deliver specific volumes within a given time period and which anticipates no interrup-
tions, but which may permit unexpected interruption in case the supply to higher priority
customers is threatened." 18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1977). "Interruptible" service is "[s]ervice from
schedules or contracts under which seller is not expressly obligated to deliver specific volumes
within a given time period, and which anticipates and permits interruption on short notice, or
service under schedules or contracts which expressly or impliedly require installation of alternate
fuel capability." Id.
The curtailment plan prescribed by Opinion 778 did not distinguish between firm and inter-
ruptible service. 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1189, 5-1091.
35. "We are impelled to direct curtailment on the basis of end use rather than on the
basis of contract simply because contracts do not necessarily serve the public interest
requirement ofefficient allocation of this wasting resource. In time of shortage, perform-
ance of a firm contract to deliver gas for an inferior use, at the expense of reduced deliv-
eries for priority uses, is not compatible with consumer protection."
Order No. 467, 38 Fed. Reg. 1503 (1973) (quoting Arkansas La. Gas. Co. 49 F.P.C. 53 (1973),
remandedforfurther consideration sub. nonL Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 517 F.2d 1223
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976)).
36. For list of priorities, see note 34 supra.
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periods." 37 A plan that uses a fixed-base period allocates gas according
to each distributor's end-use proffle during a fixed historical period,
whereas a plan using a rolling-base period allocates gas according to
data that is periodically updated to reflect changes in the distributor's
end-use profile.
Although the employment of end-use principles in curtailment
plans has received favorable judicial response,38 courts have refused to
allow the Commission automatically to apply the priorities set forth in
Order No. 467 to individual pipelines. Instead, courts have required
the Commission to demonstrate in each curtailment proceeding the
reasons why the priorities set forth in Order No. 467 should be applied
to the particular pipeline under consideration. In Arkansas Power &
Light Co. v. FPC,9 for example, the court rejected the Commission's
decision to place firm service in a higher priority category than inter-
ruptible service.4° Although Order No. 467 embodied the distinction
between firm and interruptible service,4 1 the court disapproved the em-
ployment of the distinction where the validity of its application to the
curtailment plan under consideration was not supported by substantial
evidence in the record.4 2
In Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC (Con Ed ), 43 a case which fore-
shadowed the decision in North Carolina v. FERC, the same court of
37. El Paso Natural Gas Co., Opinion No. 697, 1 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) 5-164 (1974); see
Muys, Federal Power Commission Alocation of Natural Gas Supply Shortages: Prorationing, Priori-
ties and Perplexity, 20 ROCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 301, 333 (1975).
38. See American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 882 (1974).
39. 517 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
40. Id. at 1233.
41. See note 34 supra.
42. 517 F.2d at 1233. Similarly, in American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925, 945-
46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974), the court refused to accept the unsupported pro-
position that "boiler fuel uses of natural gas are per se inferior to all other uses, for purposes of
curtailment, regardless of the particular circumstances." Accordingly, the court remanded the
case so that the Commission could state its reasons for assigning boiler fuel use on thisparticular
pioeline to the lowest priority categories. Id. American Smelting and Arkansas Power are consis-
tent with the holding in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that Order
No. 467 is a general statement of policy-not a binding rule--and that it is not a replacement for
the process of pipeline-by-pipeline adjudication of curtailment plans. See M. WILLRICH, supra
note I, at 88-92, 105 n.51.
Order No. 467 has strongly influenced curtailment plans, however. Technically, pipelines are
free to file curtailment plans that do not conform to Order No. 467. Id. at 90. By expressing a
strong preference for plans modeled after Order No. 467, though, the Commission has exerted
considerable pressure on the pipelines to file conforming plans. Id Furthermore, the threat of
liability for breach of contract with their customers may be an incentive for pipelines to file plans
consistent with Order No. 467, since "Commission approval of necessary curtailments is an effec-
tive barrier to liability where the pipeline was not in some way responsible for the shortage." Id.
43. 511 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
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appeals imposed on the Transco system a temporary negotiated settle-
ment agreement instead of a plan modeled on Order 467." The court
gave as one of its reasons: "the 467 plan does not take into account the
fact that some customers are totally dependent on Transco while others
purchase substantial quantities from pipelines supplying a much higher
percentage of contract demand. '45 The opinion in Con EdI thus cur-
sorily raised the partial/full requirements issue central to North Caro-
lina v. FERC.46
Except for Con Ed I, most of the cases47 criticizing the Commis-
sion's curtailment policy directed their criticism primarily at the FPC's
choice of certain end-use priorities for the particular pipeline under
consideration. North Carolina v. FERC, however, cast doubt on the
whole of the Commission's curtailment policy by demonstrating that
the end-use plans approved by the Commission are likely to fail to ac-
complish their purpose: the protection of high-priority users ahead of
low-priority users.48 Since the opinion questions the legality of any
end-use plan that does not achieve results consistent with end-use the-
ory,49 North Carolina v. FERC will no doubt require the Commission
to engage in a thorough reevaluation of its curtailment policy. Two
well-established features of that policy-the use of fixed-base periods
and the disregard of the partial/full requirements phenomenon-are
now particularly suspect, since the court determined that these features,
when incorporated into an end-use plan, are very likely to produce re-
sults inconsistent with end-use theory.50
As the court observed in North Carolina v. FERC, the vice inher-
ent in a plan that employs a fixed-base period is easily perceived. 51 The
achievement of true end-use allocation in 1978 is highly unlikely if gas
is allocated, as required by Opinion 778, according to data from 1972-
44. Id. at 381.
45. Id. at 380.
46. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 512 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Con Ed I1), the
court reinforced, indirectly, its earlier criticism of the Commission's failure to take into account
the partial/full requirements phenomenon. Citing that portion of Con Ed! in which it had raised
the partial/full requirements issue, the court stated that before a 467-type plan went into effect on
the Transco system, the Commission should consider the problems raised in recent judicial evalu-
ation of the application of 467 priorities to individual problems. Id. at 1347 & n.90.
47. E.g., Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 517 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cen. denied,
424 U.S. 933 (1976); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974); American
Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974); see notes
38-42 and accompanying text supra.
48. 584 F.2d at 1012-14.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1012.
51. Id.
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1973.52 Since each distributor's mix of end uses has probably changed
in the past six years, the use of such a distant fixed-base period would
constitute a serious impediment to an accurate assessment of the cur-
tailment plan's actual impact at adoption.5 3
The significance of North Carolina v. FERC's criticism of fixed-
base periods lies not in the court's express statements on the subject,
but in the implications of its reasoning. The court expressly stated that
plans using fixed-base periods are not illegal per se.54 Furthermore, the
court did not order the Commission to employ rolling-base periods in
its end-use plans. Instead, the court required the Commission simply
to collect and examine relatively current end-use data." In explaining
the reason why this current data must be made available, though, the
court implied that, while plans using fixed-base periods were not illegal
per se, most such curtailment plans would indeed be found illegal. The
Commission must have relatively current end-use data available, said
the court, so that the Commission can determine whether an end-use
plan, regardless of the type of base period it employs, would actually
produce true end-use results at the time of its adoption. 6 This determi-
nation of the plan's actual impact is necessary, in turn, for the final
determination of the plan's legality, because, the court declared, the
discrimination resulting from an end-use plan is justified only insofar
as the plan produces true end-use results.57 The implication of the
court's reasoning is that if current end-use data shows that the use of a
fixed-base period would create anti-end-use discrimination (that is, a
situation in which, contrary to the principles of end use, some of the
pipeline's customers were forced to curtail higher priority uses while
other customers of the same pipeline were still serving lower priority
uses), then the plan must be rejected, and a plan based on current end-
use data, or a plan not based on end-use at all, adopted instead. Since
the ise of fixed-base periods is likely to produce results contrary to
end-use principles,58 end-use plans employing fixed-base periods are
likely to be illegal.
One loophole through which such plans might nevertheless escape
invalidation is found in the court's intimation that if other policies
52. Id. at 1012-13.
53. Id. at 1012-13 & slip op. at 21 n.20 (as amended Aug. 29, 1978).
54. Slip op. at 21 n.20 (as amended Aug. 29, 1978).
55. Id.
56. Id
57. 584 F.2d at 1012 & slip op. at 21 n.20 (as amended Aug. 29, 1978).
58. See 584 F.2d at 1012 & slip op. at 21 n.20.
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which the Commission seeks to further by way of a curtailment plan
outweigh the need to eliminate the discriminatory anti-end-use impact
of a plan that employs a fixed-base period, the fixed-base period may
be retained as part of the plan.59 The other or "collaterar' policies to
which the Commission wishes to accommodate its end-use plans, in-
clude "(1) encouraging conservation, (2) discouraging load growth, and
(3) stimulating supplemental supplies."60 The court offered no gui-
dance, however, about the weight to be accorded each of these policies.
Furthermore, the court left some question about the manner in which
the "accommodation" or "balancing" process is to be carried out. Pre-
sumably, the degree of anti-end-use discrimination (determined from
59. 584 F.2d at 1014 n.27. These other policies, though, are to be considered only after the
actual impact of the plan, has been assessed. Id.
60. Id. The term "supplemental supplies" as used in Opinions 778 and 778-A refers not to
supplies of natural gas from other interstate pipelines, but to substitute supplies-liquified natural
gas (LNG), synethetic natural gas (SNG) storage, or propane-air injection-procured by local
distributors through their own efforts. Transcontinental Pipe Line Corp., Opinion No. 778-A, 11
FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) 5-177, 5-190 (1976).
The idea that a fixed-base period might further the Commission's policy of "stimulating sup-
plemental supplies" rests on the Commission's concern that a roling-base period "would act as a
disincentive to Transco's resale customers [distributors] attaching new supplemental supplies and
as a penalty to those resale customers which have already'attached supplemental supplies." 10
FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1097. This argument is based on the assumption that, if a rolling-
base period were used, some distributors would "upgrade their requirements," id., presumably by
extending service to more ultimate consumers in higher priority categories. These distributors
would then be entitled to a proportionately greater share of the pipeline's supply, even though
they had not made any efforts on their own to obtain supplemental supplies. Id. Since a propor-
tionately smaller amount of gas would then be available to the rest of the pipeline system, those
distributors who had obtained supplemental supplies would then be forced to use those supplies to
make up the shortfall. The result, the Commission contends, would be to shift supplemental sup-
plies from the more industrious and innovative distributors to those distributors who had made no
efforts to obtain such supplies on their own. Id.
The Commission also believes that the use of a rolling-base period, by allowing distributors
to take on more high priority consumers (thereby upgrading the distributors' requirements) with-
out securing additional supplies from sources other than Transco, would cause the limited supply
on the Transco system to be spread over a growing number of high priority consumers. Id. The
result, the Commission fears, would be increased curtailment into high priorities and perhaps into
priority one. Id. Although persuasive when considered alone, this argument is fundamentally
inconsistent with end-use theory.
For example, the Commission has made it clear that the objective of its end-use policy is
to drive low priority industrial uses to alternative fuels. It would seem to follow that a
distribution customer ought to be able to reallocate the gas used by the low priority
industrial customers to the preferred higher priority uses. This cannot happen, however,
if future deliveries are forever locked in to the historic end-use pattern of the base period
existing before the effect of curtailment was felt.
Muys, supra note 37, at 333-34. In view of the FPC's opposition to the use of rolling-base periods,
it appears that the objective of the Commission's end-use policy is to drive lower priority indus-
trial users to alternate fuels and to discourage distributors from reallocating the gas saved thereby.
By seeking to accomplish such multiple objectives, the Commission, as the court of appeals ex-
plained, attempts to accommodate its end-use curtailment plans to the collateral policies of en-
couraging conservation and discouraging load growth. 584 F.2d at 1014 n.27.
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an assessment of actual impact on ultimate consumers) resulting from a
plan with a fixed-base period is to be weighed, in each case, against the
potential benefit to collateral policies from the use of the same plan.
Language in the opinion,61 however, suggests that rather than permit-
ting a plan's anti-end-use discrimination to be justified in some in-
stances by collateral policies, the court would not allow such
discrimination to be so justified if the collateral policies sought to be
effectuated by the plan could be carried out by a nondiscriminatory
plan. If this language is controlling, then the balancing of collateral
policies against anti-end-use discrimination never comes into play.62
This closes the loophole of collateral policies and makes it all the more
unlikely that end-use plans incorporating discriminatory features (such
as fixed-base periods) would survive judicial scrutiny.
Prior to North Carolina v. FERC, and except for brief mention in
Con Ed 1,63 the issue whether the Commission should take into ac-
count post-base period changes in the relative levels of curtailment on
other pipelines in order to avoid the partial/full requirements phenom-
enon had been given little judicial consideration. The issue arose in
North Carolina v. FERC because North Carolina customers (full-re-
quirements customers) are served only by Transco, a pipeline that has
encountered very severe shortages since the 1972-1973 base period.
Most of Transco's other customers (partial-requirements customers), in
contrast, are served by one or more other pipelines that have exper-
ienced shortages of far less severity in the last several years than has
Transco.6' As the court found, a plan for one pipeline that does not
take into account post-base period changes" in the relative levels of
61. "The practical effect of the Commission's actions is to convert what it has labeled an
'end-use' plan into a conservation, supply-incentive plan; hence, the discriminatory end-use fea-
tures of the plan become arbitrary because the conservation, supply-incentive policies can be
achieved through a non-discriminatory plan." 584 F.2d at 1014 n.27.
62. This analysis was suggested in Letter from Jeffrey L. Harrison, Associate Professor, Bates
College of Law, The University of Houston, to Christopher Moore (Sept. 19, 1978) (copy on file in
office of North Carolina Law Review).
63. See text accompanying notes 43-50 supra.
64. 584 F.2d at 1013-14.
There are a number of reasons for the wide disparity in curtailments between pipe-
lines. The primary source of supply of interstate gas is the long-term contracts between
pipeline companies and natural gas producers for gas in a particular field .... The
pipeline companies with serious curtailments today did not sign contracts for extra
reserves in the 1960's, did not vertically integrate into offshore production, and were
unlucky enough to have substantial contracts with producers in fields that were ex-
hausted at an unexpectedly early date.
Harrison & Formby, supra note 1, at 82-83 (footnotes omitted).
65. Only the relative levels of curtailment on different pipelines in theyears since the 1972-
1973 baseperiod are in issue. The amounts of gas supplied to each partial-requirements customer
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curtailment on other pipelines serving the pipeline's partial-require-
ments customers can have the result of forcing its full-requirements
customers to curtail into high priorities, while partial-requirements cus-
tomers are still serving lower priorities.66 Such a result is obviously
contrary to the principles of end-use curtailment.67
The impact the court's decision will have on the partial/full re-
quirements issue is only implicit in the court's reasoning. The court
claimed that it was not requiring that the Commission "actually
allocate supplies to partial-requirements customers in relation to the
levels of curtailment on alternative pipelines," but was merely directing
the Commission to consider the partial/full requirements phenomenon
in order to assess the actual impact of the plan.68  The implication of
the court's reasoning, however, is that if an allocation plan that does
not account for curtailment on other pipelines causes discrimination
among members of the same class of end-users, then the plan will be
declared invalid. Nevertheless, the court suggested that the discrimina-
tion resulting from disregard of the partial/full requirements phenome-
non might be justified in some cases by the same collateral policies that
might also justify the use of fixed-base periods.69 As with the base pe-
by each of its supplier-pipelines during the baseperiod were taken into account in the Opinion 778
plan. See 584 F.2d at 1010.
66. Id. at 1013-14.
67. The anti-end-use vice inherent in the Commission's failure to take account of the
fact that some of Transco's customers are served by more than one pipeline can be illus-
trated by the following hypothetical. Company A and Company B have identical re-
quirements by priority. If Company A obtained half of its gas from Transco during the
1972-1973 base period and half from Pipeline X, Transco would be assigned half of each
of Company A's priorities. If Transco curtailed at 40% and Pipeline X at 20%, Company
A's curtailment would be 30% of its total supply. If Company B were supplied entirely
by Transco, it would be curtailed 40%. If the priority 1 and 2 requirements to each were
65% of its total requirements, Company A would be able to supply all of its priority 1
and 2 needs and have 5% of its total supply available for lower priorities. Company B,
on the other hand, would have to curtail its priority 2 market by 5% of its total supply
(which may be substantially more than 5% ofjust its priority 2 market). The effect then
is that Company B must curtail a portion of its priority 2 market in order that Company
A can sell inexpensive pipeline gas to its priority 3 market. Clearly in such a situation
the whole concept of protecting high priority end users is violated.
d.
68. Id. at 1014 n.22.
69. Id. at 1014 n.27. For a list of collateral policies, see text accompanying note 60 supra.
Thus, although a plan might create discrimination because it does not allocate gas to a pipeline's
partial-requirements customers in accordance with the relative levels of curtailment on alternate
pipelines, such a plan might still be valid, if the resulting discrimination were outweighed by
collateral policies (encouraging conservation, attachment of supplemental supplies, and discour-
aging load growth).
The court's suggestion that the Commission sought to justify its failure to take into account
supplies from other pipelines by invoking collateral policies, 584 F.2d at 1014 n.27, is somewhat
misleading. The Commission had these policies in mind when it decided not to use a rolling-base
period, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., Opinion No. 778, 10 FaD. POWER SERV. (M-B) at
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riod issue, however, there remains some uncertainty about the weight
that these collateral policies are to be accorded when balanced against
the discrimination resulting from a plan that fails to consider levels of
curtailment on other pipelines.70
Conspicuously absent from the opinion is any discussion of the
"inter-pipeline supply allocation" that may result from a curtailment
plan that allocates a particular pipeline's gas to its partial-requirements
customers in relation to the levels of curtailment on other pipelines
serving those customers.7' There is a question whether the Commis-
sion has the authority, in the context of a single adjudicatory proceed-
ing directly involving only one pipeline, to order into effect a
curtailment plan when inter-pipeline supply allocation results.72 The
Commission contends that a partial/full requirements adjustment on
the Transco system would have a highly complex impact on the alloca-
tion of the supplies of other pipelines that serve Transco's partial-re-
quirements customers.73 Furthermore, the Commission maintains,
such an adjustment would effectively shift gas from those other pipeline
systems to the Transco system,74 and since those pipelines are not par-
ties to the Transco proceeding, would deprive them of their due process
rights.75 Accordingly, the Commission decided that the proper vehicle
for consideration of the partial/full requirements phenomenon is not a
proceeding for curtailment on a single pipeline, but rather a general
rulemaking proceeding.
A proceeding directly involving only one pipeline is an appropri-
5-1097, and when it decided not to take into account supplemental supplies attached since the base
period. Id. at 5-1093. Furthermore, the Commission did discuss both the supplemental supplies
issue and the partial/full requirements issue in Opinion 778. Id. Careful analysis of the opinion
at id., however, demonstrates that the Commission's primary reason for its decision on the par-
tial/full requirements issue was not its desire to promote the collateral policies noted above.
Opinion 778-A, I1 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) 5-177 (1976), and the Commission's brief in North
Carolina v. FERC support the same conclusion. Instead, the Commission argued that to allocate
gas to Transco's partial-requirements customers according to post-base period changes in the rela-
tive supplies of other pipelines would constitute illegal inter-pipeline supply allocation. 10 FED.
POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1093; see text accompanying notes 71-81 infra.
70. For base period issue, see text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
71. This lacuna in the decision is puzzling in light of the considerable attention given the
issue in Opinion 778, see 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1093, and Opinion 778-A, see 11 FED.
POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-190, and in the briefs of several of the parties, see, eg., Brief for Respon-
dent Federal Power Commission at 25-29; Initial Brief for Petitioner Piedmont Natural Gas Co. at
34-37; Joint Brief for Intervenors Brooklyn Union Gas Co., North Penn Gas Co., Pennsylvania
Gas and Water Co., Public Service Electric and Gas Co., Washington Gas Light Co. at 24-28.
72. See 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1093.
73. 11 FE. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-190.
74. Id.
75. See 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1093.
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ate forum for the consideration of the partial/full requirements phe-
nomenon if one accepts the view that a partial/full requirements
adjustment does not constitute inter-pipeline supply allocation, but af-
fects only the allocation of that single pipeline's gas among its custom-
ers. 6 This view is easily supportable on the basis that a partial/full
requirements adjustment does not involve any physical interconnection
between pipelines.7" The Commission claims, however, that other
pipelines are affected by such plans through the process of "displace-
ment.""8 According to the Commission's argument, taking into ac-
count the partial/full requirements phenomenon in formulating
Transco's curtailment plan would have negative effects on other pipe-
line systems through a two-stage process. First, although discrimina-
tion against the full-requirements customers on the Transco system
would be eliminated, discrimination against Transco's partial-require-
ments customers, "vis-a-vis their fellow customers of the other pipeline
supplier," would result.7 9 A partial/full requirements adjustment
would cause the proportionate supply of Transco's gas available to
Transco's partial-requirements customers to decrease as the supplies to
full-requirements customers were increased. Given a constant level of
supply from their other pipeline sources, Transco's partial-require-
ments customers would then have a total supply of gas lower than the
total available before the adjustment of the Transco system, causing
them to curtail into higher priorities than before the adjustment. Since
other multi-pipeline customers who are not served by Transco would
be receiving an amount of gas unaffected by the adjustment on the
Transco system, the result would be discrimination against Transco's
partial-requirements customers in comparison to their fellow customers
on non-Transco systems.
The second effect of a partial/full requirements adjustment which
the Commission contends involves inter-pipeline supply allocation, oc-
curs as follows. If other pipelines attempted to eliminate the discrimi-
nation against Transco's partial-requirements customers by "reducing
their deliveries systemwide so as to increase deliveries to the partial
requirements customers affected by Transco's full/partial requirements
adjustment," the result would be inter-pipeline supply allocation by
displacement."0 The effect, according to the Commission, is to shift gas
76. See Initial Brief for Petitioner Piedmont Natural Gas Co. at 35.
77. Id.
78. 11 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-190.
79. Brief for Respondent Federal Power Commission at 27.
80. Id.
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from other pipelines to the Transco system without according the other
pipelines their due process rights.81
Even if the due process problem can be solved by a general
rulemaking procedure in which all affected parties are represented,
there remains the question whether the Natural Gas Act8 2 grants the
Commission the requisite authority to order into effect curtailment
plans that result in indirect inter-pipeline supply allocation.83 Such
plans might violate section 7(a) of the Natural Gas Act,84 which pro-
vides that "the Commission shall have no authority.. . to compel
such natural-gas company to establish physical connection or sell natu-
ral gas when to do so would impair its ability to render adequate serv-
ice to its customers." Whether the indirect inter-pipeline supply
allocation anticipated by the Commission would violate section 7(a)
would depend on whether such allocation were deemed to constitute
"physical connection," and on the reviewing court's definition of "ade-
quate service."85
Implicit in the court of appeals' failure to discuss the issue of inter-
pipeline supply allocation could be a conclusion that allocation to par-
tial-requirements customers according to the levels of curtailment on
alternate pipelines simply does not constitute inter-pipeline supply allo-
cation. 6 Or, the absence of discussion of the issue might be read to
imply that the due process problems anticipated by the Commission are
nonexistent, and that the Commission does in fact have the authority to
order indirect inter-pipeline supply allocation. It is more likely,
though, that the court's reticence on the issue. of inter-pipeline supply
allocation is a product of the court's decision to restrict the scope of its
opinion. The express holding in North Carolina v. FERC is limited to a
requirement that the Commission "first, determine, and, second,
81. See 10 FED. POWER SERV. (M-B) at 5-1093. Contrary to the Commission's argument, the
real effect of a partial/full requirements adjustment does not appear to be a shift of gas to Transco
from other pipelines. The other pipelines continue to transport and sell the same amount of gas as
before the adjustment. The real shift seems to be from the customers of the other pipelines that
serve Transco's partial-requirements customers to Transco's full-requirements customers. The
parties whose due process rights are denied, then, are those customers who are not served by
Transco, but who are served by other pipelines that serve Transco's partial-requirements
customers.
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976).
83. See Joint Brief for Intervenors Brooklyn Union Gas Co., North Penn Gas Co., Penn-
sylvania Gas and Water Co., Public Service Electric and Gas Co., Washington Gas Light Co. at
25-26 & 26 n.14.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(a) (1976); see M. WILLRICH, supra note 1, at 48.
85. See M. WuLRICH, supra note 1, at 48.
86. The court could have followed the reasoning in text accompanying notes 76 & 77 supra.
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consider the impact of its opinion on ultimate users in the implementa-
tion of a curtailment plan for the Transco system."87 The court did not
actually order the Commission to allocate gas to partial-requirements
customers in relation to the levels of curtailment on alternate pipelines;
it was therefore technically unnecessary to consider the issue of inter-
pipeline supply allocation and the potential problems associated there-
with. Nevertheless, the court should have considered the issue since the
natural implication of the court's reasoning is indeed that (absent the
influence of a sufficiently strong collateral policy) the Commission
should in fact allocate gas according to the relative levels of curtailment
on other pipelines.
North Carolina v. FERC constitutes long-awaited recognition that
the Commission's application of end-use theory does not always pro-
duce results consistent with end-use principles. In requiring the Com-
mission to consider the actual impact of end-use plans at the time of
their adoption,8 and in declaring that the discrimination resulting
from end-use plans is justified only to the extent that such plans actu-
ally protect high priority users from curtailment ahead of lower priority
users,89 the court made significant progress toward reducing existing
regional distortions in the allocation of natural gas supplies. The
court's opinion suffers, however, from a lack of clarity in its discussion
of the possibility that certain collateral policies might justify the dis-
crimination resulting from end-use plans.90 Furthermore, the court ig-
nored the potential legal infirmities of a plan that allocates gas to
partial-requirements customers according to the relative levels of cur-
tailment on other pipelines. The questions whether such a plan would
violate the due process rights of indirectly affected pipelines and
whether the Commission would have the authority under the Natural
Gas Act to adopt such a plan will no doubt arise in the process of inter-
preting and applying the opinion. By failing to discuss these issues, the
court contributed uncertainty to future curtailment proceedings.
Although it leaves a number of issues unresolved, North Carolina
v. FERC serves the useful function of illustrating the problems that
inevitably result from the allocation of natural gas on a pipeline-by-
pipeline basis. Even if each pipeline's gas were allocated in such a way
as to eliminate the discrimination resulting from the partial/full re-
87. 584 F.2d at 1015 (emphasis in original).
88. Slip op. at 21 n.20 (as amended Aug. 29, 1978).
89. 584 F.2d at 1012.
90. See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra.
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quirements phenomenon, the vastly different levels of supply on differ-
ent pipelines would preclude the achievement of true end-use results.9 '
Only if the Commission can allocate gas on a nationwide inter-pipeline
basis can it prevent lower priority users from being served in some ar-
eas while higher priority users -are being curtailed elsewhere. Alloca-
tion on a nationwide basis would, of course, require physical
interconnection between pipelines, which would in turn require reform
of the Natural Gas Act.92 Achievement of true end-use results would
also require federal regulation of local distributors, since under present
law the states are free to ignore end-use policy in regulating the alloca-
tion of gas from local distributors to ultimate consumers.93 Finally,
Congress could choose to deregulate the field price of all natural gas in
91. See Harrison & Formby, supra note 1, at 79-86.
92. M. WILRICH, supra note 1, at 233-34.
The Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-2, §§ 3-4, 91 Stat. 4, authorized the
President to order transfers of gas between interstate pipelines when necessary to protect the sup-
plies of high-priority uses of natural gas. Section 2 of the Act defined "high-priority use" as:
(A) use of natural gas in a residence;
(B) use of natural gas in a commercial establishment in amounts of less than 50
Mcf on a peak day; or
(C) any other use of natural gas the termination of which the President determines
would endanger life, health, or maintenance of physical property.
Section 4(a)(l)(C), however, provided that the President's power to order inter-pipeline deliveries
expired on April 30, 1977.
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350,printedin [19781 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws No. 12, was passed by the Senate on September 27, 1978, 124 CONG.
REc. S16,265 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978) and by the House on October 14, 1978, 124 CONG. REC.
H13,427 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978). The Act confers on the President emergency powers essentially
like those granted by the Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977. Title III of the Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978 authorizes the President to declare a natural gas emergency when service to high
priority uses is threatened, and, subject to certain conditions, to allocate gas on a nationwide basis
during such an emergency. Unlike the 1977 Act, the 1978 Act does not set a particular date
beyond which the President would no longer have power to declare a natural gas emergency.
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 also provides for certain new priorities to be followed in
curtailment proceedings. Title IV of the Act ranks "essential industrial process and feedstock
uses" ahead of all other uses except "essential agricultural uses" and "high-priority uses." Essen-
tial agricultural uses are to be protected ahead of all other uses except high-priority uses. Essential
agricultural use is defined in § 401(f)(1) as
any use of natural gas--(A) for agricultural production, natural fiber production, natural
fiber processing, food processing, food quality maintenance, irrigation pumping, crop
drying, or (B) as a process fuel or feedstock in the production of fertilizer, agricultural
chemicals, animal feed, or food, which the Secretary of Agriculture determines is neces-
sary for full food and fiber production.
High-priority user is defined by § 401(t)(2) as "any person who-(A) uses natural gas in a resi-
dence; (B) uses natural gas in a commercial establishment in amounts of less than 50 Mcf on a
peak day; (C) uses natural gas in any school, hospital, or similar institution; or (D) uses natural
gas in any other use the curtailment of which the Secretary of Energy determines would endanger
life, health, or maintenance of physical property." Finally, § 402(d)(1) defines essential industrial
process or feedstock use as "any use of natural gas in an industrial process or as a feedstock which
the Secretary [of Energy] determines is essential."
93. See M. WILLRICH, supra note 1, at 233-34, 275-76.
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hopes of increasing supplies and thereby reducing the need for regula-
tion of curtailment. 4 Even if deregulation of prices were to increase
supplies dramatically, however, shortages would most likely remain
sufficiently serious to require some form of regulation over curtail-
ment. 5 While it is difficult to predict with any accuracy the future
form that natural gas allocation will take, North Carolina v. FERC
demonstrates that future end-use curtailment plans will be subjected to
close judicial scrutiny designed to ensure that such plans produce true
end-use results.
CHRISTOPHER WHITMAN MOORE
Attorney-Client Privilege-Diersfled Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith: New Rules for Applying the Privilege When the
Client Is a Corporation
The attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure confidential
communications between an attorney and his client.' The privilege ap-
plies in both individual and corporate client contexts; when the client is
a corporation, however, application of the privilege may prove more
complex than when the client is an individual. Two questions must be
answered in determining the applicability of the privilege in the corpo-
rate client context: first, what types of activity constitute legal services
by the attorney and, second, which employees of a corporation may be
deemed to so represent the corporation as to be the corporate client. 2
In Diversifted Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,3 the United States Court of
94. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, does not deregulate prices on all natural gas, but
"gradually ends controls on the price of newly discovered gas until the price ceiling is lifted in
1985." 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2615-16 (1978); see note 5 supra.
95. See M. WILLRICH, supra note 1, at 13-14.
I. A number of criteria must be satisfied in order for the attorney-client privilege to apply.
"(1) Were legal advice of any kind is sought (2)from aprofessional legal advisor in his capaciy es
such, (3) the communications relating to thatpurpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6)
are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure ... (8) except the protection be
waived." 8 J. WIOMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
2. See, e.g., Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546
(D.D.C. 1970); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
3. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978).
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed both these issues4 and
adopted new tests for determining when an attorney is acting in his
professional capacity5 and for deciding which employees represent the
corporation.
In 1975, the Weatherhead Company, a customer of Diversified In-
dustries, Incorporated, brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern IDistrict of Missouri against Diversified, alleging con-
spiracy to bribe Weatherhead employees.' During the course of this
litigation Weatherhead sought to discover a memorandum and report
that had been prepared earlier for Diversified by the law firm of
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (the Law Firm) and the corporate minutes
that referred to those writings. The memorandum and report were the
result of an intracorporate investigation that the Law Firm had con-
ducted for Diversified.' Endeavoring to protect the writings from dis-
4. A third issue of less importance arose in DiversfedIndustries that concerned the possible
waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Diversified had revealed documents to the SEC (pursuant
to subpoena during an official investigation); later it sought to protect the documents against dis-
covery by plaintiff in a private lawsuit. The question was raised whether Diversified had thereby
waived its attorney-client privilege with respect to those documents. The court concluded that it
had not: "As Diversified disclosed these documents in a separate and nonpublic SEC investiga-
tion, we conclude that only a limited waiver of the privilege occurred." 572 F.2d at 611 (citations
omitted). Although the Divers#fedIndustries court devoted only three sentences to this issue, there
is considerable disagreement among jurisdictions concerning whether such disclosure constitutes a
waiver. Compare In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.RD. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(voluntary production of documents for the SEC constitutes waiver), with United States v. Good-
man, 289 F.2d 256, 259 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961) ("It has been
uniformly held that a prior disclosure to investigating officials cannot constitute a waiver of the
privilege with respect to the same matter in a subsequent legal proceeding. A waiver of the privi-
lege must occur in the same proceeding. . . in which it is sought to be invoked."), and Bucks
County Bank & Trust Co. v. Storck, 297 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Haw. 1969) (testimony given to support
motion to have seized property returned does not constitute general waiver), and IBM Corp. v.
Sperry Rand Corp., 44. F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968) (partial disclosure of privileged material to
third party during business negotiations not waiver of privilege in subsequent patent infringement
action).
5. See 572 F.2d at 610.
6. See id at 609.
7. The conspiracy allegation charged Diversified employees with bribing Weatherhead em-
ployees to make purchases of inferior copper. Id at 600.
8. In 1974 and 1975 Diversified became involved in litigation relating to a proxy fight. Dur-
ing the course of this litigation evidence revealed that Diversified might have maintained a fund
with which to bribe purchasing agents of other companies, including Weatherhead. Following
this litigation, Diversified's Board of Directors felt that an investigation should be made of the
corporation's practices. The Law Firm was then hired to make an investigation, interview em-
ployees, draw conclusions about the propriety of employee conduct, and make recommendations
to the Board concerning a future course of action. The Board of Directors instructed all employ-
ees to cooperate fully with this investigation. The memorandum outlined the manner in which the
Law Firm planned to conduct the investigation. Id The report detailed the actual investigation,
made findings with respect to the question whether a slush fund had been used in violation of
Diversified's standard business practices and internal controls, and made recommendations. Id
at 601. Certain corporate minutes restated parts of the report.
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covery, Diversified asserted that the documents were not subject to
discovery because they were protected by the attorney-client privilege.9
The district court refused to deny discovery and Diversified petitioned
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for a writ of mandamus.10
The petition was first considered by a three-judge panel. Judge
Henley, speaking for the majority, concluded that because the Law
Firm had merely acted as an investigator and had not provided Diver-
sified with legal services or advice when it prepared the memorandum
or the report, the attorney-client privilege did not apply to the docu-
ments.I' He therefore found it unnecessary to decide if the employees
interviewed by the Law Firm represented the corporate client. Judge
Heaney dissented, finding that the Law Firm had provided legal serv-
ices and that the employees interviewed by the Law Firm sufficiently
represented the corporation to be deemed the corporate client for pur-
poses of application of the privilege.12 The case was then reheard en
banc. After the hearing, Judge Heaney, this time for the majority,
wrote an opinion similar to his prior dissent. The court adopted the
position that a corporation's commitment of a matter to an attorney
raises a presumption of legal services in favor of the corporation. The
court thus found that while performing the investigation and preparing
the report the Law Firm was acting in its professional capacity as a
provider of legal services.' 3
The court then turned to the question whether the corporate cli-
ent's communication was privileged, and in particular, to the question
of when an employee communication can be classified as a corporate
client's communication. Traditionally this has been decided using ei-
ther the control group test or the subject matter test. 14 Under the con-
trol group test only a corporate employee who can act on the attorney's
9. Diversified also claimed that the documents were protected under the "work product"
privilege of rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the rule, however, an
attorney's work product must be "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial." The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the documents sought by Weatherhead had not been so
prepared. Id at 604.
10. Diversified had asked the district court to certify the question of privilege as appropriate
for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). The district court refused, ordered
disclosure of the documents, and Diversified petitioned the court of appeals for relief. 572 F.2d at
598-99.
I1. 572 F.2d at 603.
12. Id at 605-06 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
13. Id at 610. While this served to protect the Law Firm's report, it did not protect the
memorandum, which was merely a preliminary document. In this respect, the en banc opinion
affirmed the earlier opinion.
14. Id at 608.
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advice may be deemed to represent the corporation. 5 Under the sub-
ject matter test only a corporate employee who communicates to the
attorney at the direction of his superior concerning the subject matter
of his employment may be identified as the corporate client.' 6 The
court of appeals concluded that the control group test "is inadequate
for determining the extent of a corporation's attorney-client privi-
lege"' 17 and proposed instead a modified subject matter test.' 8
The attorney-client privilege protects the confidentiality of com-
munications between attorney and client made for the purpose of se-
curing legal advice. The history of the privilege extends back to the
reign of Elizabeth I.19 The privilege as originally conceived belonged
to the attorney-it was a point of honor for the attorney to protect a
client's secrets.20 By the late 1700's, however, this theory had been re-
pudiated and replaced by the contemporary view that the privilege be-
longs to the client.21 As presently understood, the purpose of the rule is
to encourage clients to seek legal advice freely and to speak openly
with their attorneys by removing clients' apprehension that their com-
munications will be divulged.22
The attorney-client privilege may be invoked to protect communi-
cation between an attorney performing legal services and his client,
when the communication is intended to be confidential.2 3 A communi-
cation by an attorney to a client is protected to the same extent as a
communication by a client to an attorney, since the former may reveal
15. Id at 602 (citing City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485
(E.D. Pa. 1962), mandamus andprohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312
F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963)). See also note 42 and accompanying
text infra.
16. See 572 F.2d at 602 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-
92 (7th Cir. 1970), aftdmen byan equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971)). See also notes 43 &
44 infra. The original subject matter test made its appearance in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), af'd mem. by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
See notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text infra.
17. 572 F.2d at 609.
18. Three judges dissented from the opinion. Judge Henley, dissenting, reasserted his con-
clusion that the Law Firm acted merely as an investigator, not as legal counsel. Id at 614 (dis-
senting opinion). Judge Gibson, also dissenting, concluded that the corporate minutes were not
protected from disclosure because they were open to the shareholders and thus their confidential-
ity had been waived. Id at 616 (dissenting opinion). Judge Bright, in a third dissenting opinion,
argued that the entire controversy was moot because Weatherhead had already uncovered the
information it sought from SEC files. Id at 617 (dissenting opinion).
19. J. WIGMORE, .supra note 1, § 2290, at 542.
20. Id at 543.
21. Id
22. Id § 2291. See also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 322-23
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
23. J. WmMORE, sipra note 1, § 2292.
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the substance of the latter.24 The attorney-client privilege is a personal
privilege and as such, might be thought of as being available only to
individuals, but it has been held applicable to communications to or
from a corporate client. 25 Corporations, like individuals, must be free
to communicate openly with their attorneys in order to procure needed
legal advice without fearing the repercussions of disclosure. Deciding
when the privilege may properly be invoked is, however, more difficult
in the corporate context because of the greater difficulty of determining
whether the attorney's services are actually legal services and identify-
ing who constitutes the client.26 Moreover, proper resolution of these
issues in the corporate context requires accommodating conflicting in-
terests-the need of the corporation for confidentiality on the one
hand, and on the other, the desire for disclosure on the part of the pub-
lic and of those businesses dealing with the corporation-while not ex-
tending the benefits of the attorney-client privilege beyond the interests
the privilege was designed to protect.
Because the privilege exists only when the attorney is acting in his
professional capacity as a lawyer, the first question that must be ad-
dressed in determining the scope of the privilege in an attorney-corpo-
rate client situation is what constitutes performance of legal services.27
The lawyer must be engaged in legal activities such as offering legal
advice, applying law to fact, and preparing for and carrying on litiga-
tion.28 When an attorney is performing tasks that could as easily have
been accomplished by laymen, the privilege does not apply.29 Nor does
the privilege apply when the attorney is acting, for instance, as a busi-
24. See Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
25. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
26. See text accompanying notes 36 & 37 infra.
27. See Georgia-Pacific Plywood v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464
(SD.N.Y. 1956).
28. There is a privilege only if... the person to whom the communication was made is
acting as a lawyer in connection with this communication .... "Acting as a lawyer"
encompasses the whole orbit of legal functions. When he acts as an adviser, the attorney
must give predominantly legal advice to retain his client's privilege of non-disclosure,
not solely, or even largely, business advice . . . . [Attorneys act as lawyers] when in
specific matters they are engaged in applying rules of law to facts known only to them-
selves and other employees of their client-companies, and in preparing cases. . . and
prosecuting appeals .... They do not "act as lawyers" when not primarily engaged in
legal activities.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954).
29. Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D.D.C.
1970); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood, 18 F.R.D. 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y.
1956).
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ness adviser.3 ° Since a corporate attorney often acts as both legal and
business adviser, the two functions must in some way be distin-
guished.31 Most courts have employed a case-by-case factual analysis
when addressing the issue of legal services. Diversfed Industries de-
parts from this practice in adopting a rule that the existence of legal
services is prima facie established by commitment of a matter to a legal
adviser. Moreover, these prior cases concerned house counsel or coun-
sel in the corporation's patent department,32 while DiversffiedIndustries
involved outside counsel. Therefore, Diversftd Industries also consti-
tutes recognition that there is potential for intermingling of legal and
business advice even when outside counsel is involved.33
A second and separate issue in applying the privilege is the deter-
mination of when. a corporate employee communication can be classi-
fied as the corporate client's communication. Corporations function
differently from individuals in several important respects. 4 While an
individual client is usually the only source of disclosure to an attorney,
the corporate client potentially has numerous spokesmen.35 An indi-
vidual client both gives information and makes decisions based on the
attorney's advice, while in a corporation these functions may be split in
such a way that some employees are information-givers and others are
decisionmakers. 36 While it is easy to determine whether a communica-
tion by an individual client is intended to be confidential, this is not the
case for the corporate client. Communications divulged to numerous
30. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963); United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751,753 (D. Del. 1943);
see Pye, Fundamentals of the Attorney-Client Privilege, PRAc. LAW., Nov. 1969, at 17-22.
31. "[T]he corporate lawyer is... often a business as well as legal advisor .... However,
privileged protection does not extend beyond communications necessary for legal advice and
therefore a job of line-drawing is inevitable." Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer,
56 ILL. B.J. 542, 543 (1968).
32. See, e.g., Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546
(D.D.C. 1970) (when communications by corporation's patent attorney concern tasks which could
have been performed by nonlawyers privilege does not apply); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 193 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1960) (house counsel's requests to corporate executive for
factual information on which to base legal opinion and executive's reply held privileged); Geor-
gia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Co., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (when in-
house counsel doing mostly patent work primarily communicated business advice, communica-
tions not privileged).
33. The court never stresses that it is dealing with outside rather than house counsel, and thus
the court in all likelihood intended the presumption of legal services to apply to both. However, it
is possible to argue that the presumption only applies to outside counsel since the court only
addressed that factual setting.
34. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(b)[04] (1977).
35. Id
36. Id
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corporate employees may still be intended to be confidential.17 Be-
cause of these distinct characteristics of the corporate client, the courts
have been called upon to create devices for determining when an em-
ployee speaks for the corporation and may thus be deemed to be the
corporate client. Several different approaches to this problem have
been employed.
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.38 suggested that a
communication by any officer or employee of a corporation is privi-
leged. 9 This blanket approach has not generally been accepted.40
Most courts use either the control group test or the subject matter test
to identify the corporate client. The control group test, introduced in
City ofPhilade:phia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. ,4 attempts to equate
the corporate client with the individual client by holding that only
those employees who help control the corporation by giving informa-
tion and participating in -decisions about future action on the basis of
the attorney's advice represent the corporation.42 In Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,43 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit found the control group test inadequate and expanded the attor-
ney-client privilege to protect some communications by corporate
employees not within the control group. The court created the subject
37. The issue of personification of the corporate client does not frequently appear in the cases
prior to 1963, the year that City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483
(E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibiion denied sub nom. General Elec. Corp. v. Kirkpatrick, 312
F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963), introduced the control group test. Ap-
parently, until 1963 it was simply assumed that the attorney-client privilege applied to corporate
clients. The privilege was not explicitly held to apply to a corporation until Radiant Burners, Inc.
v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
38. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), ajf'dper cur/am, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
39. Id at 359; see 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 34.
40. This broad approach to the problem could conceivably conflict with the United States
Supreme Court's statement in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947), that the statements of
employees who are merely witnesses to an incident are not privileged. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 34.
41. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus andprohibition deniedsub nom. General Electric
Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
42. [I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a
position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which
the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized mem-
ber of a body or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply.
In all other cases the employee would be merely giving information to the lawyer to
enable the latter to advise those in the corporation having the authority to act or refrain
from acting on the advice.
Id at 485.
43. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), a f'dmem by an equaly divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
In Harper & Row, plaintiffs filed an antitrust suit against defendants and sought to inspect memo-
randa prepared by the defense attorneys after debriefing employees of defendant who had testified
before a federal grand jury investigating the publishing industry. Id at 489-90.
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matter test, which accords protection to a communication if it was
made by an employee at the direction of a superior and if its subject
matter was within the scope of the informant's employment.' Al-
though both these tests have been criticized,45 they are still in use. The
control group test appears to be more widely used, perhaps because it is
more easily applied and more clearly understood than the subject mat-
ter test.46
The court in Divers4'ed Industries, in addressing the two issues of
legal services and identity of the corporate client, acknowledged the
importance of determining whether the Law Firm was giving legal or
lay advice,47 and also recognized48 and attempted to deal with the criti-
cisms of the control group and subject matter tests. 49 These considera-
tions led to two new rules. The first new rule arose from an issue about
which there was much conflict within the court: whether the Law Firm
had performed legal services for Diversified. The en banc majority an-
nounced that when a person seeks an attorney it is prima facie estab-
lished that legal advice and services are being requested and given.50
When no evidence is presented to defeat this prima facie case, it will be
found that the attorney was acting in his professional capacity.5 1 The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit appears to be the first court to
subscribe to this rule, first proposed by Dean Wigmore,52 although a
number of commentators had previously supported it.13
44. [An employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is suffi-
ciently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation's
attorney is privileged where the employee makes the communication at the direction of
his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's
advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the perform-
ance by the employee of the duties of his employment.
Id at 491-92.
45. See note 69 infia.
46. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400
(E.D. Va. 1975).
47. 572 F.2d at 610.
48. Id at 608-09.
49. For a description of the criticisms, see note 69 infra.
50. 572 F.2d at 608-09.
51. 1d
52. It is not easy to frame a definite test for distinguishing legal from non-legal advice.
Where the general purpose concerns legal rights and obligations, a particular incidental
transaction would receive protection, though in itself it were merely commercial in na-
ture. ... mhe most that can be said by way of generalization is that a matter commit-
ted to a professional legal adviser is prima fade so committedfor the sake of the legal
advice which may be more or less desirable for some aspect of the matter, and is there-
fore within the privilege unless it clearly appears to be lacking in aspects requiring legal
advice.
Id at 610 (quoting J. WIGMoRE, supra note 1, § 2296, at 566-67).
53. One commentator suggested that the corporation should have the benefit of the inference
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This prima facie approach imposes limitations on discovery by
making it more difficult for the party seeking discovery to show that the
sought-after documents are not privileged. Judge Henley, objecting to
the rule in his dissenting opinion, pointed out that the party seeking
disclosure, who must rebut the presumption, often does not know why
a particular matter was entrusted to an attorney. He further added that
often there is no way to find out.54 The majority nonetheless did imply
that the party seeking discovery is required to produce specific evidence
that the attorney was acting in a business rather than a legal capacity
when the particular communication in question was made. The better
rule, it would seem, would be to permit the party challenging the privi-
lege to make a general showing that the attorney has regularly acted as
a business adviser and not just as a legal adviser to the corporation in a
subject area that includes the communication in issue. If this showing
were made, then the burden would remain on the corporation to show
that the particular communication involved a legal matter." Under the
qualified rule, it would still be relatively easy for the corporation to
make an initial showing on the matter of legal services, but the corpo-
ration would bear a much heavier burden of persuasion when the party
seeking discovery points to regular activity by the attorney in a business
capacity. This qualification would retain the benefits of the Divers8fed
Industries prima facie rule while preventing some of its potential
inequities.
In Dipersjfed Industries, the Law Firm was engaged by the corpo-
ration to provide information about the activity of the corporation's
employees, the legal implications of that activity, and the wisest course
to take while remaining within the bounds of the law.5" Thus, even if
the party seeking discovery alleged that the Law Firm acted regularly
in a business capacity, the corporation could carry its burden of persua-
sion by showing that the Law Firm's work pertinent to this case was
essentially legal in character and, under the foregoing analysis, pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege.
that an attorney is rendering legal advice when consulted by the corporation and that the party
seeking disclosure would have the burden of indicating otherwise. Simon, The Attoniey-Client
Privilege ar Applied to Corporations, 65 YA L.L 953, 977-78 (1956). A student Note also sup-
ported this approach: "Since the prevailing motive of clients in consulting attorneys is the need for
legal advice, the mere fact of legal consultation is prima facie the establishment of a professional
relationship." Note, he Law.yer- Client Privilege" Its Application to Corporations, the Role of Ethics
and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 235, 236 (1961).
54. 572 F.2d at 613-14 (Henley, J., dissenting).
55. See Simon, supra note 53, at 977-78.
56. 572 F.2d at 610.
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The business adviser role was not presented in the facts of Diversi-
fied Industries; rather, the court was faced with the question whether an
attorney offers legal services when he acts, at least in part, as an investi-
gator.17 The court's holding that the Law Firm in its investigatory role
did offer legal services is supported by the reasoning that before an
attorney can provide legal advice he must first discover and assess the
facts surrounding a matter.5 8 Generally, a lawyer seeks factual infor-
mation in order to evaluate it and render legal advice. If courts refused
to accept this position, an attorney could only retain the privilege for
his client by explaining the legal purpose behind every step of the in-
vestigation.59 Since it is often impossible for an attorney to know
where a factual inquiry will lead until he has the facts, it is impossible
for him to indicate for what legal purpose he is seeking each piece of
information. Moreover, only the attorney has the training and skills
necessary to evaluate the information he obtains by investigation.6 °
Thus it is essential for the attorney to conduct at least parts of the in-
vestigation himself, since only he knows what each new piece of infor-
mation may portend and what pattern the investigation should follow.
The court also examined the type of advice given during the inves-
tigation to determbe whether the Law Firm as investigator was provid-
ing legal services. Judge Henley, dissenting, contended that the
recommendations of the Law Firm "could have been made by any firm
of private investigators, or by accountants, or by bankers, or, for that
matter, by any person possessing ordinary common sense and business
prudence.'61 The majority, however, found that neither accountants
nor lay investigators "would have had the training, skills and back-
ground necessary to make the independent analysis and recommenda-
tions which the Board felt essential to the future welfare of the
corporation. ' 62 The majority approach apparently recognizes that, in
57. Id at 610. The court found the Law Firm to be providing legal services notwithstanding
that the president of Diversified testified that he believed the Law Firm acted merely in an investi-
gative capacity. The court gave several reasons for this result: (1) the president, Woodlief, was not
employed until some two months after the Law Firm was retained; (2) it was impossible to deter-
mine if the president thought of attorney-client advice only in a litigation context; and (3) the
president's belief was only one factor in the court's decision, and the totality of circumstances
indicated the privilege was applicable. Id at 610 n.3.
Judge Henley argued that an attorney acting as an investigator is not offering legal services.
Id at 614 (dissenting opinion).
58. "[F]actflnding is usually the first task of the lawyer." Simon, supra note 53, at 974 n.66.
59. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251, 253 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
60. 572 F.2d at 610.
61. Id at 615 (Henley, J., dissenting).
62. Id at 610.
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situations involving a corporate client, 3 there is rarely a clear-cut dis-
tinction between legal and other services, and that the determination
rests on whether the attorney relied primarily on legal skills and gave
advice that was predominantly legal. While the attorney-client privi-
lege must be construed so that it does not interfere unduly with the
scope of discovery,6 the privilege must still be broad enough to accord
with the realities of corporate structure and operation. If the privilege
were to be lost because some business considerations and advice were
intermingled with primarily legal advice, the privilege would be of no
value to the corporate client. 5 Moreover, a broad definition of legal
advice does not necessarily extend the privilege, because the other re-
quirements of the privilege66 still may act to restrict its scope.
Having determined that the corporation was receiving legal serv-
ices, the court had then to decide if the communications involved were
made by persons who could properly be considered the corporate client
so that the attorney-client privilege could be applied. To aid its deci-
sionmaking, the court announced its second new rule-a new test for
determining who may personify the corporate client:
[T]he attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's commu-
nication if (1) the communication was made for the purpose of secur-
ing legal advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so
at the direction of his corporate superior, (3) the superior made the
63. The considerations discussed here may apply to individual clients as well. Often an indi-
vidual receives advice from his lawyer that is not purely legal, but rather contains such an inter-
mingling of legal and nonlegal matters that it is impossible to separate the two for purposes of
applying the privilege.
64. Under federal rules, any matter that is relevant to the case is subject to discovery, unless
privileged or a part of the attorney's work product under the Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508
(1947), exception, discussed in note 40 supra. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. The modern trend has been
toward broader discovery because of the desirability of obtaining all the relevant facts. 2 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 34.
65. The privilege may, under these circumstances, lack viability for the individual client as
well. See discussion in note 63 supra. The court recognized that such a narrow view might have
severe repercussions for the existence of the privilege, as did Judge Wyzanski in United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), when he addressed the problem of
outside counsel and stated:
They were not acting as business advisors or officers ... even though occasionaly their
recommendations had in addition to legal points some economic or policy or public
relations aspect and hence were not unmixed opinions of law. The modern lawyer al-
most invariably advises his client upon not only what is permissible but also what is
desirable. And it is in the public interest that the lawyer should regard himself as more
than a predictor of legal consequences. His duty to society as well as to his client in-
volves many relevant social, economic, political and philosophical considerations. And
the privilege of nondisclosure is not lost merely because relevant nonlegal considerations
are expressly stated in a communication which also includes legal advice.
Id at 359 (emphasis added).
66. Note 1 supra.
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request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the sub-
ject matter of the communication is within the scope of the em-
ployee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not
disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate
structure, need to know its contents. We note. . . that the corpora-
tion has the burden of showing that the communication in issue
meets all of the above requirements.67
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is apparently the first court
to employ this test,6" which is a modified subject matter test that strikes
a balance between the much-criticized control group and subject matter
tests.69 This new test expands the amount of information that a corpo-
ration can communicate to its attorney with the assurance that it will be
protected, while it avoids the potential abuse of protecting all corporate
employee communications from discovery.70
Under the court's analysis, following the preliminary determina-
tion that the attormey functions as provider of legal services, the focus
shifts to the reason for which the client seeks the attorney's assistance.
The requirements that the communication be made for the purpose of
securing legal advice, and that a superior request an employee to com-
municate so that the corporation can secure legal advice, assure that the
corporation is barred from claiming a privilege it did not intend to cre-
ate at the outset. These requirements also prevent the corporation from
sending routine reports and memoranda to its attorney and then claim-
ing they are privileged.7 1 With these requirements the test focuses not
67. 572 F.2d at 609.
68. The test announced by the court was borrowed from Judge Weinstein. 2 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 34.
69. The control group test has been criticized as defeating the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege because it would deny the privilege to the communications of most corporate employees,
and thereby inhibit disclosure to the attorney. See Note, Privileged Communications-Inroads on
the "Control Group" Teit in the Corporate Area, 22 SYRAcusE L. REv. 759, 767 (1971). The con-
trol group test may thus unreasonably narrow the corporate client's ability to communicate fully
with the attorney. Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 873, 875 (1971). On the other hand, the subject matter test has been
criticized because it could protect. every employee's communication and thus make discovery im-
possible. Note, supra, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group
Test, 84 HARV. L. REv. 424, 432 (1970). Originally, the Supreme Court's proposed rule of evi-
dence 503 on the attorney-client privilege defined a representative of the client in terms of the
control group test. However, because no agreement could be reached on the matter of which test
to use, the definition was simply left out of the final draft of proposed rule 503. 2 J. WEINSTE N &
M. BERGER, supra note 34, 503 [01]. In the end, Congress substituted a single rule on privilege
for the 13 separate ruler drafted by the Supreme Court. This single rule is FED. R. EviD. 501.
70. Thus it remains compatible with the Supreme Court's statement in Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947), discussed in note 40 supra.
71. 572 F.2d at 609.
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on who is communicating with an attorney but why.72
The requirement that the employee make the communication at
the direction of his superior is taken directly from the subject matter
test73 and focuses on who is communicating with the attorney. This
requirement is another means for ensuring that the establishment of an
attorney-client relationship was intended at the outset. The underlying
consideration of this particular aspect of the subject matter and modi-
fied subject matter tests seems to be that the employee must somehow
represent the corporation, a consideration that was the main focus of
the control group test. The requirement as it is presented here, how-
ever, is freed from the overly restrictive approach of that test. Under
this requirement, the employees may become an extension of the con-
trol group when they are directed to communicate by their superiors.
When there is such control of the employees' communications by
superiors who are involved with the attorney, the employees may be
deemed to personify the corporation in making these communications.
The goal is to assure that the communications for which protection is
sought were intended to be made by the corporation in the context of
an attorney-client relationship and were not the unauthorized com-
ments of an employee who casually gave the attorney information.
The requirement that the subject matter of the communication be
within the scope of the employee's duties is the other element of the
original subject matter test that is carried over into the new test. This
requirement denies the privilege to the communications of an employee
who was merely a witness to an event.7 4 In situations in which the
employee is performing his corporate duties, he can be deemed to act
for or personify the corporation. When he is merely a witness, this is
not a valid assumption. Moreover, this requirement ensures that only
work expressly done on behalf of the corporation and which is thus
entitled to be kept a corporate confidence will be privileged.
The last requirement demands that a communication not be dis-
seminated beyond those with a need to know its contents. This require-
ment aims at protecting only those communications intended to be
confidential, a traditional prerequisite for the assertion of the privi-
lege.75 This test recognizes that, because of the structure of a corpora-
72. See Kobak, The Uneven Application of thelttorney- Client Privilege to Corporations in the
Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REv. 339, 341, 371 (1972).
73. See note 44 supra.
74. See note 40 supra.
75. In order for a communication to be protected it must be a confidential communication.
"The requirement that the communication be made 'without the presence of strangers' means that
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tion, and in order for the corporation to function, there must be some
dissemination of information beyond the employee who makes the
communication and the attorney who receives it.76 On the other hand,
indiscriminate dissemination of information within the corporation
tends to indicate that such information was not intended to be confi-
dential, and the corporation cannot assert confidentiality at a later date
simply because changed circumstances make it desirable to claim the
privilege. This requirement strives to achieve an appropriate balance
and permits communications to be disseminated within the corporation
to a limited extent and still be deemed confidential.77
When applying the attorney-client privilege to corporations, the
ultimate goal is to achieve a balance that fosters the purposes of the
privilege while protecting the scope of discovery. The court must deal
with the complexities of the corporate structure and be aware of the
characteristics that distinguish a corporate from an individual client.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in its examination of the
questions of performance of legal services and of personification of the
corporation, has adopted rules that advance the pursuit of the goal.
The rule that matters committed to a lawyer are prima facie so commit-
ted in order to obtain legal services brings some order into a confusing
area. By using this approach, courts need no longer depend on an en-
tirely case-by-case approach. The prima facie rule will make decisions
in this area more uniform, and will alleviate some of the enormous
confusion that results from attempts to distinguish between legal and
nonlegal advice. This rule would, however, be improved if qualified to
permit the party seeking discovery to defeat the prima facie case by
the communication must have been intended as confidential, i.e., not intended to be related to
others.' IBM Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 12 (D. Del. 1968).
76. See general, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested
Approach, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 360, 377-78 (1970).
[I]n order to foster the policy of encouraging full and accurate disclosure by clients
• . . communications within the corporation that are necessary for completeness and
accuracy of information given the attorney should be considered confidential even
though they have been communicated to third persons .... Thus, in order properly to
perform his function, the attorney must be able to reveal fully to decision makers the
substance of what he has learned from corporate employees and the ramifications
thereof without fearing that he would thereby remove the privilege from information
that would otherwise be protected.
id at 378.
77. The court in DiversfedIndustries found that Weinstein's requirements had been satisfied
in the case of the report prepared by the Law Firm. The communications were made and directed
by the Board of Directors to be made for the purpose of securing legal advice, the interviews only
covered matters within the employees' corporate duties, and the corporation avoided disseminat-
ing the information to anyone other than those directly concerned with the investigation.
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showing that an attorney has regularly acted in another capacity for a
corporation. Finally, even though the modified subject matter test will
probably have its critics, this new test appears to effect a balance be-
tween the narrowness of the control group test and the expansiveness of
the traditional subject matter test on the issue of personification of the
corporation. In a confused field the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit has provided much needed clarity.
SHERI A. VAN GREENBY
Constitutional Law-Administrative Searches-Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc.: OSHA Needs a Warrant
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) inspectors have since
OSHA's passage seven years ago' entered and inspected the business
premises of thousands of employers to ascertain compliance with the
myriad of job safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.2
A great number of these inspections have been made pursuant to sec-
tion 8(a)3 of OSHA, which apparently authorized warrantless inspec-
1. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970), was
signed into law on December 29, 1970, and became effective April 28, 1971. Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 34, 84 Stat. 1590.
2. The stated congressional purpose behind OSHA was
[11o assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources-
3) by authorizing the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and
health standards applicable to business affecting interstate commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). The Secretary has used this authority to promulgate over 4,400 safety
standards. Brief for Appellee at 39, Marshall v. Barlow, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978) (citing R.
SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT. ITS GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 11
(1976)). Because the Act makes these standards applicable to business affecting interstate com-
merce, over four million business establishments are covered. Comment, OSHA: Employer
Beware, 10 Hous. L. REv. 426, 429 (1973).
3. Section 8(a) of OSHA provides:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting
appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized
1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment,
construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by
an employee of an employer, and
2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable
times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of em-
ployment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equip-
320 [Vol. 57
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tions.4 Before the enactment of OSHA the Supreme Court had held
that "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a[n adminis-
trative inspection] .. , of private property without proper consent is
'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search war-
rant."5 The Court later held that the exceptional cases in which war-
rants are not needed include administrative inspections of certain
heavily regulated businesses. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,7 the Court
refused to extend this narrow exception to the warrant requirement,
and held that search warrants are required for OSHA inspections.8
OSHA authorities chose Barlow's, Incorporated for inspection
based on OSHA's standard selection process.' When the inspector ap-
peared the president of Barlow's refused to permit an inspection of the
employee area of the business because the inspector did not have a
warrant.10 The inspector returned three months later armed with a
court order compelling the president to submit to arr inspection.'1 Con-
ment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner,
operator, agent, or employee.
29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970).
4. In some instances OSHA inspectors, rather than relying on their authority under § 8(a) to
make warrantless inspections, have nonetheless obtained a warrant before inspecting the particu-
lar premises. See, eg., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Va.
1977); Lockport Non-Ferrous Casting, Inc. v. Marshall, 441 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Mar-
shall v. Reinhold Constr., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 685 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Morris v. United States Dep't
of Labor, 439 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (mem.); In re Northwest Airlines, Inc., 437 F. Supp.
533 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (mem.); Empire Steel Mfg. Co. v. Marshall, 437 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mont.
1977); Marshall v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., Fed. Malleable Div., 433 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Wis.
1977).
5. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). See also See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967).
6. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); accord, United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
7. 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
8. Id at 1820.
9. Id at 1819. OSHA determines which businesses to inspect based on a priority system.
First priority is given to businesses that have experienced a catastrophic accident. Next priority is
given to instances in which there have been employee complaints. Then come the "target indus-
tries" chosen because of a characteristically high incidence of injury in the industry. The lowest
priority is given to random inspections as in Barlow's. See D. PETERsoN, THE OSHA COMPLI-
ANCE MANuAL 13 (1975); Brief for National Federation of Independent Business as Amicus Cu-
riae at 14 n.2, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
10. 98 S. Ct. at 1819.
11. After the inspector was denied permission to inspect, OSHA regulations required him to
report this to his area director who was to "take appropriate action, including compulsory process,
if necessary." 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1977). Compulsory process has in the past taken one of two
forms: (1) a search warrant granted by a federal magistrate or judge, see, e.g., cases cited note 4
supra; or (2) an order compelling the businessman to submit to the inspection, see Usery v. Cen-
trif-Air Mach. Co., 424 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F.
Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976) (three-judge panel) (mem.); Brennan v. Gibson Prods., Inc., 407 F.
Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976).(three-judge panel); Brennan v. Buckeye Indus., Inc., 374 F. Supp.
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sent was again refused and Barlow's brought an action to enjoin OSHA
from conducting warrantless inspections. 12 A three-judge court ruled
in Barlow's favor,' 3 holding that if consent to inspect is denied, the
fourth amendment requires OSHA inspectors to obtain a warrant and
that section 8(a) authorizing warrantless inspections is
unconstitutional. 14
Affirming the lower court's holding that warrantless OSHA inspec-
tions are unconstitutional, the Supreme Court reinforced its prior hold-
ings "that the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches protects against warrantless intrusions during civil as well as
criminal investigations"' 5 and "that this rule applies to commercial
premises as well as homes."16 Because "warrantless searches are gener-
ally unreasonable" a warrantless search would have to fit under a rec-
ognized exception.' 7 The Secretary argued that despite this rule the
warrantless OSHA inspection is reasonable and therefore an exception
to the warrant requirement rule. Specifically, the Secretary urged that
OSHA inspections are covered by the warrant requirement exception
applicable to pervasively regulated businesses. 8 The Court, however,
reasoned that this exception for inspections of certain heavily regulated
businesses is inapplicable because the degree of federal involvement in
OSHA-affected businesses does not rise to the level necessary to acti-
vate that exception.' 9 According to the Court, federal imposition of
1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974). It is the latter type of compulsory process that the OSHA inspectors
presented on their second visit.
In prior cases in which OSHA had sought orders to compel, OSHA had made no effort to
establish administrative probable cause, (for discussion of administrative probable cause, see notes
24 & 25 and accompanying text infra), but had merely cited the provisions of§ 8(a) as evidencing
their authority to inspect. See, e.g., 418 F. Supp. at 629 n.3. The Court in Barlow's indicated that
the order to compel an inspection may be the "functional equivalent of a warrant" if the fourth
amendment is satisfied by a showing of administrative probable cause. 98 S. Ct. at 1827 n.23.
12. 98 S. Ct. at 1819.
13. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976) (three-judge panel), af'dasub
noa. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
14. The lower court entered an injunction prohibiting any OSHA searches under § 8(a). Jus-
tice Rehnquist stayed that order pending appeal except as it applied to Barlow's. Jurisdictional
Statement at 37.
15. 98 S. Ct. at 1820. The Secretary had argued that Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), were distinguishable from Barlow'p
because the municipal housing codes involved in Camara and See, unlike OSHA, provided for
fines for refusal to consent to an inspection. Brief for Appellant at 14. The holding in Barlow'r
would seem to indicate that it is not the punitive nature of a fine or sanction but the invasion of
privacy interests occasioned by the inspection that is determinative.
16. 98 S. Ct. at 1820.
17. Id
18. Id
19. OSHA covers all businesses affecting interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1970).
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minimum wages and maximum hours does not constitute sufficient reg-
ulation to find implied consent to detailed OSHA inspections.20
The Secretary also contended that the warrantless inspection was
reasonable, and therefore in compliance with the fourth amendment,2"
because OSHA enforcement depends upon warrantless inspections and
because the restrictions on agency discretion in the Act protected pri-
vacy as much as a warrant would. The Court found, however, that
contrary to the Secretary's assertions, warrantless inspections are not
essential to the proper enforcement of OSHA,22 and the incremental
protections of the employer's privacy afforded by a warrant are not "so
marginal that [the protections] fail to justify the administrative burden
that may be entailed."'2
The cases in which the Court had previously found exceptions to the warrant requirement rule for
administrative inspections involved a federally licensed retail liquor dealer, Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), and a federally licensed firearms dealer, United States
v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). Barlow's held that whereas a liquor or firearms dealer, by engag-
ing in a regulated business, "has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of govern-
mental regulation," 98 S. Ct. at 1821, all businesses involved in interstate commerce are not
regulated so heavily that engaging in them would constitute implied consent to later searches.
20. 98 S. Ct. at 1821. The Court's discussion of the point indicates that the level of govern-
ment intrusion impliedly consented to by a certain business corresponds to that level of federal
regulation covering the business. Conceivably, the Court could find that the relatively minor min-
imum wage regulations would support implied consent to some lesser intrusions. See note 86
infra.
The Court also rejected the argument that because work areas are open to employees these
areas should be open to inspectors. 98 S. Ct. at 1821-22. If, on the other hand, the area to be
inspected is open, not only to employees, but to the general public as well, then the inspector does
not need a warrant. See, e.g., Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861
(1974).
21. 98 S. Ct. at 1822. Although the Court discussed the Secretary's two contentions in differ-
ent parts of the opinion, both contentions are basically that the warrantless OSHA inspection is
reasonable. The first contention, that OSHA inspections come within those cases allowing war-
rantless inspections of heavily regulated businesses, is termed by the Court "an exception from the
search warrant requirement." Id at 1820. The finding, however, of such an exception to the rule
that warrantless searches are generally unreasonable is tantamont to finding a reasonable search.
Indeed, the cases recognizing this exception speak in terms of the reasonableness of the search.
See, eg., Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75 (1970).
22. 98 S. Ct. at 1822. The Court based this determination on its belief that "the great major-
ity of businessmen can be expected in normal course to consent to inspection without warrant,"
id; its inference that because OSHA regulations provide for obtaining compulsory process if con-
sent is initially refused, the Secretary must have determined that such a procedure would not
cripple the Act's effectiveness, id at 1823-24; and its observation that if surprise is actually impera-
tive, then the desired result may be achieved by obtaining an ex parte warrant before seeking to
inspect, id at 1824. Justice Stevens, in dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, stated
that he "would defer to Congress' judgment regarding the importance of a warrantless search
power to the OSHA enforcement scheme." Id at 1829 (dissenting opinion).
23. Id at 1825. The Court concluded that a warrant would "provide assurances from a neu-
tral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is
pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria," id at 1826, and "advise
the owner of the scope and objects of the search, beyond which limits the inspector is not expected
to proceed," id Stevens! dissent urged that the first function would be served by the statute itself
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Although the Court found that OSHA inspections are not reason-
able absent a warrant, it also held that the showing necessary for the
issuance of an administrative warrant is not the same as "probable
cause in the criminal law sense."'24 The standard of "administrative
probable cause" may be met by
showing that a specific business has been chosen for an OSHA search
on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of
the Act derived from neutral sources, such as, for example, disper-
sion of employees in various types of industries across a given area,
and the desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of
the area.25
Thus, the Court continued a middle of the road posture with respect to
administrative inspections by requiring a warrant, but one that could
be issued on a showing of administrative probable cause rather than
the more rigid standard of particularized probable cause.26
and pertinent regulations. Id at 1830 (dissenting opinion). It is inconsistent with traditional
fourth amendment analysis, however, to allow the searcher's own set of rules to substitute for the
determination of a neutral and detached magistrate. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948) (a warrant's "protection consists in requiring. . . a neutral and detached magistrate in-
stead of. . . the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"); Brief
for Appellee at 43. The Secretary urged, however, that, unlike police officers in the field, OSHA
field inspectors do not exercise discretion in determining which businesses to inspect; that decision
belongs to the area director. Therefore, a magistrate's warrant is not needed because the area
director serves as the neutral and detached decisionmaker. Brief for Appellant at 35, 44-45; cf. 37
CIN. L. REv. 243, 246-47 (1968) (distinguishing police searches from health inspections with simi-
lar discretion argument).
24. 98 S. Ct. at 1824. If criminal probable cause were required it would be necessary for
OSHA agents to demonstrate to a magistrate that they had probable cause to believe conditions
on the particular business premises to be searched were in violation of OSHA standards. This
standard can be termed particularized probable cause because it requires an assessment of a par-
ticular situation. It is this feature that distinguishes probable cause in the criminal law sense from
administrative probable cause.
25. Id at 1825. The fourth amendment comprises two different clauses: (I) the reasonable-
ness clause---"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated," and (2) the warrant
clause---"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. The clauses are interrelated by virtue of the general rule that searches made
pursuant to a valid warrant under the warrant clause are reasonable and thus not prohibited by
the reasonableness clause; searches made without a warrant are prohibited unless they fall within
an exceptional class of searches that are considered reasonable apart from any requirement of a
warrant. The Barlow'r majority found the OSHA inspection to be unreasonable and therefore
under the warrant requirement. The warrant they require, however, does not meet the probable
cause standard of the warrant clause. The dissenters correctly assert that the administrative stan-
dard of probable cause, based not on a particularized belief that there are violations on the prem-
ises, but on compliance with administrative selection procedures, is inconsistent with the warrant
clause. 98 S. Ct. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion accuses the majority of
acting inconsistently in using the lack of a warrant to find the search unreasonable but then only
requiring an administrative warrant based on less than particularized probable cause.
26. For definition of particularized probable cause, see note 24 supra.
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Prior to the birth of administrative probable cause in Camara v.
Municipal Court27 and See v. City of Seattle,2 the Supreme Court had
consistently held that the protections of the fourth amendment had no
application outside the criminal area.2 9 The reversal of this position
began in Camara in which the appellant was arrested and convicted
under a city ordinance for refusing to allow city housing inspectors to
inspect the portion of his leased premises that he used as a residence. 30
The Court held the fourth amendment warrant requirement applicable
to the administrative search contemplated by the municipal housing
code. 31 Yet, the Court realized that the criminal standard of particular-
ized probable cause was inappropriate for such compliance inspec-
tions.32 Instead, a new standard applicable to administrative
inspections was enunciated: "'[P]robable cause' to issue a warrant to
inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards
for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particu-
lar dwelling."33
In See v. City of Seattle, the appellant was arrested and convicted
for refusing to allow city housing inspectors to inspect his commercial
warehouse. The Court held that "Camara applies to similar inspec-
tions of commercial structures which are not used as private resi-
dences."' The opinion, however, contained some dicta that was to
become the basis for later exceptions to the rule:
We do not in any way imply that business premises may not reason-
ably be inspected in many more situations than private homes, nor
do we question such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing pro-
grams which require inspections prior to operating a business or
27. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
28. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
29. See Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (per curiam) (equally divided Court let stand
decision by Ohio Supreme Court upholding conviction of defendant who refused to submit to
warrantless housing inspection); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (upholding defendant's
conviction on similar facts as Eaton but inspection was prompted by neighbor's complaint); f.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (fourth amendment protected defendant from seizure
of business invoices that could be used to establish violations of revenue laws because sanctions
involved were in substance criminal). For further background on application of the fourth
amendment in civil in contrast to criminal contexts, see generally Sonnenreich & Pinco, The In-
spector Knocks: Administrative Inspection Warrants Under an Expanded Fourth Amendment, 24
Sw. LJ. 418 (1970).
30. Id. at 525-27.
31. Id. at 534.
32. Id. at 536. This is true because "the agency's decision to conduct an area inspection is
unavoidably based on its appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole, not on its knowledge of
conditions in each particular building." Id
33. Id at 538.
34. Id at 542.
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marketing a product. Any constitutional challenge to such programs
can only be resolved, as many have in the past, on a case-by-case
basis under the general Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness. 35
Thus, the See holding was carefully limited to local housing code in-
spections and did not "consider the reach of the Fourth Amendment
with respect to various federal regulatory statutes. 36
The Court had its first opportunity to resolve a conflict between
the fourth amendment and a federal regulatory scheme in Colonnade
tatering Corp. v. United States.37 Colonnade had been licensed by the
State of New York to serve liquor and was subject to the federal retail
liquor dealer's tax.38 In the course of enforcing the latter regulation,
agents of the Internal Revenue Service3 9 requested permission to in-
spect a locked warehouse on Colonnade's premises. Permission was
refused by Colonnade's president on the ground that the agents did not
have a search warrant. Thereupon, the agents broke the lock and con-
fiscated a quantity of liquor.40 The Court held that the warrant re-
quirement of Camara and See was not applicable in this case, 41 basing
its holding on the long history of "close supervision and inspection" of
the liquor industry.42 The Court noted that warrantless liquor inspec-
tions date from pre-fourth amendment legislation.43 Moreover, this
special treatment of liquor inspections was predicated on a governmen-
tal property interest in untaxed liquor.44 The idea that an owner en-
gaging in a highly regulated business in effect consents to warrantless
inspections did not begin to appear until later cases.
This exception to Camara and See was broadened two years later
by United States v. Biswell.45 Biswell was a pawn shop operator feder-
35. Id at 545-46.
36. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 313 (1972).
37. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
38. Id at 72.
39. Agents of the Alcohol and Tobacco Division of the IRS have broad statutory authority to
enter and inspect the premises of retail liquor dealers; dealers who refuse such inspections can be
fined $500. Id at 73-74; see I.R.C. §§ 5146(b), 7342, 7606.
40. 397 U.S. at 73.
41. Id at 76. The precise holding in Colonnade was that Congress, although constitutionally
able, did not provide for warrantless inspections of liquor dealers but instead imposed a fine of
$500 on those who refused to submit to a warrantless inspection. The agents were required to
return the liquor, which was also barred from use as evidence.
42. Id at 77.
43. Id at 75.
44. Id at 76 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886)).
45. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
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ally licensed to deal in sporting weapons.46 A city policeman and a
federal Treasury agent seeking to ascertain compliance with federal
law asked to enter a locked storeroom on Biswell's premises. Biswell
unlocked the storeroom and allowed the inspectors to enter without a
warrant but only after being referred to the warrantless inspection pro-
vision in the Gun Control Act.4' The Court ultimately held that this
warrantless search provision fell within the Colonnade exception to
Camara and See."8 Because, however, "[flederal regulation of the in-
terstate traffic in firearms is not as deeply rooted in history as is govern-
mental control of the liquor industry,"49 the Court found it necessary to
augment its Colonnade reasoning with four inferred factors in order to
uphold the Biswell search: (1) Gun control is an important federal in-
terest and inspection is a crucial part of the regulatory scheme.5 (2)
The requirement of a warrant easily could frustrate this crucial inspec-
tion.1 (3) Protections afforded by a warrant would be negligible.52 (4)
The threat to privacy is limited since the dealer is already engaging in a
46. Id at 312.
47. Id The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976), authorizes federal agents
to enter the premises of any firearms or ammunition dealer to examine documents, firearms, or
ammunition. Id § 923(g).
48. 406 U.S. at 317. Whether the search was lawful depended on whether the warrantless
search provision of the Gun Control Act was constitutional and not on whether Biswell's consent
to the search was valid. If the warrantless search provision was unconstitutional, Biswell's con-
sent, given only after reading the provision, could not support the search. Cf Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (consent to search obtained after presentation of invalid warrant is
insufficient). And, if the warrantless search was constitutional, the lawfulness of the search did not
depend on consent. 406 U.S. at 315.
49. 406 U.S. at 315. It is also clear that the government had no property interest in weapons
as it did in untaxed liquor.
50. Id This factor is arguably present in the housing code situations of Camara and See.
51. Id at 316. The Court in Camara failed to discuss the possibility that a warrant require-
ment would frustrate housing code inspection programs except to say "lilt has nowhere been
urged that fire, health, and housing code inspection programs could not achieve their goals within
the confines of a reasonable search warrant requirement." 387 U.S. at 533. The Biswell Court,
however, found that gun control would be frustrated by a warrant requirement and distinguished
the housing code situation by observing that building code violations were "conditions that were
relatively difficult to conceal or to correct in a short time;" warrants could, therefore, be required
"with little if any threat to the effectiveness of the inspection system there at issue." 406 U.S. at
316. The Court was undoubtedly referring to its recommended procedure of first seeking consent
and then reappearing with a warrant after having alerted the building owner of an impending
inspection. See 387 U.S. at 539-40. The Court was concerned that the unannounced aspect of gun
control inspections, which they considered crucial, would be jeopardized by a warrant require-
ment. The opinion never addressed the possibility of obtaining an ex parte warrant before the
search.
52. 406 U.S. at 316. The Court did not elaborate on this factor except to indicate that if an
inspection under the Gun Control Act is to be effective it must be flexible with regard to time,
scope and frequency, and that any warrant that allowed this flexibility would not provide much
protection. Id
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pervasively regulated business. 53
Because Biswell represented an expansion of the Colonnade excep-
tion, the question arose whether the exception had replaced the
Camara-See warrant requirement.54 This uncertainty was resolved in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States55 in which the Court reaffirmed the
Camara-See rule. In Almeida-Sanchez, petitioner's automobile had
been stopped and searched twenty-five miles from the Mexican border
by roving border patrol agents who had neither a warrant nor probable
cause for the search. 6 The search uncovered marijuana and led to pe-
titioner's conviction for illegal importation.5 ' The search was con-
ducted pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which
provided for warrantless searches of automobiles within a reasonable
distance from the border.5 8 Almeida-Sanchez challenged this provision
as a violation of the fourth amendment. The Government argued that
the warrantless search provision came within the Colonnade-Biswell ex-
ception to the warrant requirement rule.59 In holding the search un-
constitutional, the Court rejected the applicability of the Colonnade-
Biswell exception.6" Although there was a history of federal regulation
in the case,61 as there was in Colonnade and to a lesser extent in
53. Id This factor is the only one listed by the Bswell Court that was based on the
Colonnade rationale of a highly regulated business. The Biswell opinion, unlike Colonnade, hints
of an implied consent rationale. "When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated
business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records,
firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection." Id
54. Cf. 98 S. Ct. at 1821 ("The clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated industry
of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswell is the exception. The Secretary would make it the
rule.")
55. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
56. Id at 267-68.
57. Id at 267.
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1976). The related regulation provides that a reasonable distance
is "within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States." 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2)
(1978).
Although the statute allows warrantless searches for illegal aliens, marijuana discovered
would be admissible if it was "in plain view" during a search for illegal aliens and provided that
such a search for aliens was constitutional. Cf. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968)
("objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence").
59. 413 U.S. at 270-71. The government did not attempt to justify the search as within the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement that allows warrantless searches of automobiles
if there is probable cause. Id at 269-70; see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Since
there was no probable cause in.41meida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 268, the automobile exception would
have been of no avail.
60. 413 U.S. at 271.
61. "Since 1875, Congress has given 'almost continuous attention.., to the problems of
immigration and of excludability of certain defined classes of aliens."' .d at 292 (White, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Kleindienst v. Maudel, 408 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1972)).
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Biswell, the Court distinguished those cases as involving implied con-
sent to search:
A central difference between those cases and this one is that
businessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enter-
prises as [alcohol and firearms] accept the burdens as well as the ben-
efits of their trade, whereas the petitioner here was not engaged in
any regulated or licensed business. The businessman in a regulated
industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.62
Unlike Almeida-Sanchez, the petitioner in Barlow's was engaged
in a regulated business. But the Court distinguished Barlow's from
Colonnade and Biswell on the grounds that the degree of business regu-
lation in Barlow's did not support implied consent to search as it did in
Colonnade and Biswell. Such an implied consent rationale, however, is
obviously a fiction and alone is an insufficient basis for applying the
Colonnade-Biswell exception.63 Indeed, the Court recognized a second
ground on which to distinguish Colonnade-Biswell-whereas liquor
and firearms regulatory programs would be frustrated by a warrant re-
62. 413 U.S. at 271. The Almeida-Sanchez dissent considered the Colonnade-Biswell excep-
tion broad enough to cover that case. The dissent argued that two of BiswelKr four factors, see text
accompanying notes 50-53 supra, would support a warrantless search. Specifically, the dissent
noted the important federal interest in immigration control, and the belief that roving patrol
searches were essential to the regulatory scheme, to support the warrantless search. 413 U.S. at
292-93 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent discussed the history of immigration regulation, not to
support an implied consent argument, but to bolster the finding that immigration control is an
important federal interest.
The position of Chief Justice Burger and Justice White in Barlow's, voting to require OSHA
to get a warrant, is clearly inconsistent with their dissenting posture in Almeida-Sanehez in which
Justice White argued that the roving border patrol warrantless search was sanctioned by Colon-
nade-Biswell. Id at 294. Moreover, Justice White, writing for the Barlow's majority, cited the
majority language in Akielda-Sanchez in order to distinguish Colonnade and Biswell. 98 S. Ct. at
1821. In the past both Justice White and Chief Justice Burger have been receptive to reasonable-
ness arguments as justifications for not requiring law enforcement officers to get warrants. It was,
however, their unwillingness to accept the reasonableness analysis of Justice Stevens that was
crucial to the outcome of Barlow'r. The inconsistency is perhaps explained by the different proba-
ble cause showing required for criminal as opposed to administrative searches. In the criminal
area, in which there is a rigid requirement of particularized probable cause, Chief Justice Burger
and Justice White may be more disposed to permit warrantless searches based upon a reasonable-
ness analysis than in the administrative area in which the probable cause requirement is less strin-
gent. This argument, however, does not adequately explain why Chief Justice Burger and Justice
White voted to allow warrantless roving border patrol searches in Almelda-Sanchez rather than
supporting Justice Powell's position requiring an administrative warrant. See 413 U.S. at 275
(Powell, J., concurring).
63. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, implied consent, taken to its logical extreme,
can be reduced to absurdity. Stevens observed that under an implied consent analysis it is only
those regulatory programs started long ago that will come under the Colonnade-Biswell exception.
98 S. Ct. at 1832-33 (dissenting opinion). A logical extension of the implied consent doctrine
would demand that if businessman A started his business before the regulations began he would
be protected from warrantless searches, while businessman B who began business after it was
subject to regulation could be said to have impliedly consented to a warrantless inspection
provision.
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quirement,64 the success of OSHA is not so dependent on a warrantless
inspection. In support of this conclusion, the Court reasoned that
OSHA would not be affected adversely by a warrant requirement be-
cause most businessmen would consent to warrantless OSHA
inspections.65
This reliance on the probability that businessmen will consent to
government intrusions is perhaps unsound in view of the inevitable
awareness that consent is not required. An additional distinction, not
emphasized by the Court, suggests more strongly that the success of
OSHA is not dependent on warrantless inspections: whereas no one
directly involved with an illegal liquor or firearms operation has any
interest in informing the government of the illegality, employees do
have significant interest in informing OSHA of safety violations.
Moreover, information concerning violations can be relayed anony-
mously.66 Employee complaints, therefore, provide an alternative en-
forcement opportunity available to OSHA regulators that was not
available in the liquor and firearms cases.
Thus, although the Barlow's opinion stressed the implied consent
rationale, the Court implies that the availability of alternative enforce-
ment opportunities is also a factor distinguishing the Barlow's warrant-
less inspection from those upheld under the Colonnade-Biswell
exception to the warrant requirement. Combining these two factors,
application of the Colonnade-Biswell exception appears subject to a
two-pronged requirement that there be (1) regulation of a business en-
terprise sufficient to support an implied consent to search theory67 and
(2) no alternative enforcement opportunity to a warrantless inspec-
tion.68 Since these requirements for the Colonnade-Biswell exception
64. Cf. Biswell v. United States, 406 U.S. at 316 (in context of gun control in which violations
are easily concealed, a warrant could frustrate deterrent effect of inspections).
65. See note 22 and accompanying text supra. The Court also noted that OSHA regulations
require agents to seek compulsory process if entry to inspect is denied rather than forcibly entering
the premises. This regulation, not required by the Act, is viewed by the Court as evidence that the
Secretary himself does not believe that warrantless, surprise inspections are necessary for OSHA's
effectiveness. 98 S. Ct. at 1823-24.
66. Furthermore, "[no person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any
employee because such employee has filed any complaint ... under or related to [OSHA]." 29
U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1970).
67. See, B/swell, and Almeida-Sanchez all mention federally licensed and regulated enter-
prises. It is likely, however, that a license requirement in a regulatory scheme will not alone
activate the Colonnade-Biswell exception. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 526
n.l (housing ordinance required each owner to obtain license renewable every year upon inspec-
tion). Thus, the amount of regulation and not the license requirement is determinative.
68. The unavailability of enforcement opportunities other than warrantless inspections is not
sufficient without the implied consent requirement to activate the Colonnade-B/swell exception. In
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were not satisfied, the Barlow's Court found that warrantless OSHA
inspections were unreasonable and therefore unconsitutional6 9
While Barlow's did find that warrantless OSHA inspections were
unconstitutional, the Court held that a warrant need not be supported
by a showing of particularized probable cause but only by a showing of
administrative probable cause.70 The dissenters in Camara and See, as
well as Justice Stevens in Barlow's, were correct in arguing that admin-
istrative probable cause is inconsistent with the literal language of the
fourth amendment warrant clause.7" Particularized probable cause,
however, is inappropriate in an OSHA context just as it was in the
housing code cases. Because the purpose of OSHA inspections is more
to encourage compliance with the safety regulations than to catch vio-
lations that are thought to exist,7 2 a decision to inspect is necessarily
based on criteria such as the safety record of an entire industry rather
than on knowledge of violations within particular business premises.
Thus, requiring a particularized probable cause standard would limit
OSHA inspections to those conducted pursuant to employee com-
plaints or after catastrophic accidents and thereby curtail OSHA's abil-
ity to encourage pre-accident compliance with safety regulations. If
compelled to require particularized probable cause and thus emascu-
Almelda-Sanchez, Justice White argued quite convincingly that warrantless roving border patrol
searches were essential to stop the flow of illegal immigrants, 413 U.S. at 293 (White, J., dissent-
ing), however, the Colonnade-Biswell exception was not applied because there was no business
regulation to support implied consent. See id at 271, quoted in text accompanying note 62 supra.
In some instances in which the implied consent argument is especially strong, due to specific
regulation in an unusually dangerous enterprise, implied consent alone may support the
Colonnade-Biswell exception, even though there are other enforcement opportunities available.
See text accompanying notes 79-83 infra.
69. Part I of the majority opinion in Barlow's deals with the applicability of the Colonnade-
Biswell exception to the warrant requirement rule, while part II deals with the determination of
the reasonableness of the warrantless inspection by balancing administrative necessities against
the incremental protection a warrant would provide. As noted above, note 21 supra, finding the
Colonnade-B/swell exception applicable constitutes a finding that the search is reasonable.
In the context of a fill scale intrusion into privacy such as an OSHA inspection, it is unlikely
that the balancing test discussed in part II would ever render a warrantless search reasonable.
This test does not consider the privacy expectations of the inspectee as does the Colonnade-Biswell
test, which contains the implied consent element. A balancing test is only appropriate in a situa-
tion in which there is a limited intrusion. Cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (routine warrantless stops for questioning at permanent border check points are constitu-
tional based on balancing of governmental interests and personal privacy interests, but intrusion
was "quite minimal"). Therefore, due to the inapplicability of a balancing test in a full scale
intrusion context, the entire reasonableness inquiry should be whether the Colonnade-Bsell ex-
ception is applicable. It is necessary, however, to borrow the "no other enforcement opportuni-
ties" factor from the balancing analysis in order to adequately distinquish Colonnade-Biswell from
Barlow's.
70. 98 S. Ct. at 1824.
71. See note 25 su.pra.
72. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970), quotedin note 2 supra.
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late OSHA, the Court would likely have found the inspections to be
reasonable and therefore not subject to any warrant requirement. Re-
quiring the administrative warrant instead is preferable because it does
provide the businessman protection from a vengeful regulator by re-
quiring that the decision to inspect be based on a rational administra-
tive selection process. 3 Such protection, while not as great as that
afforded by particularized probable cause, is better than no independ-
ent review of the inspection decision.
The ultimate impact of Barlow's on OSHA enforcement might de-
pend in part on the level of actual consent required to justify a consen-
sual administrative inspection.74 As noted earlier, the Barlow's
decision was based in part on the Court's belief that most employers
probably would consent to a warrantless inspection. How valid the
Court's guess is will depend to a significant extent on what level of
consent will be required. If a voluntariness test as found in the crimi-
nal context75 is required for consent to an administrative inspection,
arguably fewer businessmen will be held to have given their consent.
In the criminal context, knowledge of the right to withhold consent to
search, while not necessary, is a factor in determining the voluntariness
of the consent.76 For example, submitting to a search by a government
agent who announces "I am here to search your premises" has been
held not to constitute valid consent in a criminal case.77 Some lower
courts may be willing to apply a less rigid standard for administrative
inspections, just as the Camara Court lessened the probable cause
standard.78
73. For a detailed discussion by lower courts on the showing that would support an OSHA
warrant, see Reynolds Metals Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Va. 1977), and
Morris v. United States Dep't of Labor, 439 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. Ill. 1977).
74. Despite the vigorous arguments by the Secretary of Labor that a warrant requirement
would severely hamper OSHA enforcement, see Brief for Appellant at 44-45, George H. R. Tay-
lor, Director of the AFL-CIO's new Occupational Safety and Health Department (whose or-
ganization filed an amicus brief on behalf of appellant), stated that an amendment to a Small
Business Administration bill passed by the Senate "is a far worse threat than the Barlow'r deci-
sion." Bus. WEEK, Sept. 11, 1978, at 53. That amendment would exempt from OSHA regulations
businesses in low injury rate industries with 10 or fewer employees. Id
75. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to criminal search requires
voluntariness based on consideration of totality of circumstances).
76. Id at 232-34.
77. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (no valid consent when defendant acquiesced
in search by revenue officers who said they had come to search premises for violations of revenue
law).
78. In two OSHA cases, Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 519 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.
1975), and Stockwell Mfg. Co. v. Usery, 536 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1976), lower courts found ade-
quate actual consent to inspection when inspectors merely showed their credentials and were then
allowed to search. The courts in these cases did not consider that the actual consent standard they
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Barlow's will also affect other federal regulatory statutes that pro-
vide for warrantless inspections but, unlike OSHA, are aimed at spe-
cific industries rather than all businesses affecting interstate commerce.
Soon after the Barlow's decision the Supreme Court vacated and re-
manded for reconsideration in light of the Barlow's decision a Sixth
Circuit case79 involving warrantless safety inspections under the Coal
Mine Safety and Health Act8 . Justice White suggested that these sin-
gle industry warrantless inspections might be constitutional "where
regulations [are] so pervasive that a Colonnade-Biswell exception to the
warrant requirement could apply."'" Even if a single industry inspec-
tion does not come under that exception, many of the statutes provide
for resort to federal court for an order to compel inspection rather than
allowing a forcible inspection.82 Once in court the agency could make
a showing of administrative probable cause and then be allowed to
search.83
Moreover, Barlow's will affect other federal regulatory inspections
that, like OSHA, are aimed at thousands of businesses in many unre-
lated industries. For example, the Supreme Court recently vacated and
remanded for reconsideration in light of Barlow's two Fifth Circuit
cases challenging the government's right to make warrantless inspec-
tions to check compliance with employment discrimination rules that
affect all businesses that contract with the federal government.84 Re-
applied was any different from that applied in criminal cases. An argument can be made, how-
ever, that the consent involved in these cases did not rise to the Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973), voluntariness requirements. Thus these holdings indicate a willingness to relax
actual consent standards in administrative searches.
79. Consolidation Coal Co. v. United States, 560 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1977), vacated and
remanded, 98 S. Ct. 2841 (1978) (mem.).
80. Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified as
amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
81. 98 S. Ct. at 1825. Despite this dicta Justice Stevens believed that the Barlow's decision
rendered inspection provisions in legislation directed at single industries presumptively invalid.
Id at 1834 n. 11 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
82. Id at 1825 nn.18 & 19.
83. OSHA regulations, but not the Act itself, required that inspectors seek compulsory proc-
ess if entry was refused. The issue in Barlow's was not whether an adequate showing had been
made in court to support the order compelling inspection, but whether any resort to judicial proc-
ess was needed given the Act's provision for warrantless inspections.
84. In United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated
and remanded mem., 98 S. Ct. 2841 (1978), and United States v. Mississippi Power & Light Co,
553 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded mem., 98 S. Ct. 2841 (1978), two utilities
questioned the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964-1965 Compi-
lation), as amendedby Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. § 406 (1969), which prohibits employment
discrimination by government contractors. The constitutional challenge is based in part on a
fourth amendment violation in that the Order requires government contractors to permit access to
their books and records by government officials to determine compliance with the Order. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that public utilities come within the Colonnade-Bswell
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consideration of these cases will inevitably focus on two aspects of the
implied consent rationale not fully clarified in Barlow's.
First, because the defendants in these employment discrimination
cases are electric utility companies and therefore heavily regulated in
the rate-setting function of their business, the question arises whether
regulation of rates will support implied consent to inspections concern-
ing employment practices. Barlow's did not answer this question be-
cause no aspect of the business involved in that case was appreciably
regulated. In both Colonnade and Biswell the warrantless inspections
were directly related to the purposes behind the federal regulation con-
sidered crucial in upholding the inspections. Moreover, it would strain
the existing fiction of implied consent if regulation in one aspect of a
business could lead to implied consent to a search relating to another
aspect. It would seem, therefore, that regulation in one aspect of a
business cannot support consent to a search related to another aspect. s5
A second aspect of the Barlow's implied consent rationale that
must be explored in the reconsideration of these employment discrimi-
nation cases is whether the electric utilities by contracting with the fed-
eral government to supply electricity have impliedly consented to
warrantless inspections in the same way that businessmen engaging in
certain federally regulated businesses have. If the warrantless inspec-
tion is related to the contract provisions, the business, by accepting the
benefits of the contract, might be said to accept the burden of warrant-
less inspection. In the electric utility cases, however, selling electricity
to the government has nothing to do with hiring practices. Therefore,
requiring these utilities, because they contract with the government, to
be subject to unrelated warrantless inspections of employment records
is inconsistent with the implied consent requirement behind the Colon-
nade-Biswell exception.
Even if the government is able to succeed on the implied consent
arguments,86 the second requirement of the Colonnade-Biswell test, that
exception, and therefore the warrantless search of employee records is not a fourth amendment
violation. 553 F.2d at 471.
w). in a lower court OSHA decision, a three-judge court refused to apply the Colonnade-
B/swell exception to allow a warrantless OSHA inspection of an employer who manufactured
ammunition, a business presumably regulated by the Gun Control Act. Dunlop v. Hertzler Enter-
prises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976) (three-judge panel). The court did not discuss
whether this particular manufacturer came under the provisions of the Gun Control Act, but a
manufacturer of ammunition is covered by the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) (1976).
86. Some language in the Barlow's opinion arguably could support a finding ofimplied con-
sent in the employment discrimination cases. See 98 S. Ct. at 1821. A lesser intrusion of looking
through employment records (as opposed to detailed and minute OSHA inspections) might be
supported by a lesser amount of regulation or, conceivably, by pervasive regulation in other as-
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there be no alternative enforcement opportunities, should preclude the
application of the warrant requirement exception in the employment
discrimination context. The regulatory enforcement of employment
discrimination rules will not suffer appreciably due to a warrant re-
quirement because employees, just as they have an interest in reporting
safety hazards, have an interest in reporting employment discrimina-
tion. Because there are effective alternative enforcement opportunities,
fourth amendment rights need not bow to the urgent federal interest in
the employment discrimination area.
The result of Barlow's is laudable in that it halts, temporarily at
least, the Burger Court's erosion of fourth amendment rights.8 7 The
Court recognized that protection of privacy provided by administrative
probable cause is not counter-balanced by mere administrative conven-
ience or congressionally perceived urgency. In finding the Colonnade-
Biswell exception to the warrant requirement inapplicable, the Court
emphasized that consent to inspect, implied from a businessman's
awareness of significant government regulation of his business, is nec-
essary to support a warrantless inspection. In addition, although im-
plied consent is the primary factor in a Colonnade-Biswell analysis,
there should also be an inquiry into whether there are alternative en-
forcement opportunities available to government regulators. These two
factors provide a test to determine whether the Colonnade-Biswell ex-
ception is applicable to allow a warrantless regulatory inspection.
Thus, by examining both the level of implied consent and the availabil-
ity of alternative enforcement opportunities, a proper balance can be
pects of the business, such as rate-setting in the case of utilities. The Barlow's Court, however,
indicated that an industry-by-industry regulatory scheme is the type of regulation that would sup-
port implied consent, not a broadly sweeping regulatory scheme that includes all business con-
tracting with the government.
87. See, eg., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding that evidence seized uncon-
stitutionally, but in good faith, is admissible in federal civil tax proceeding); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (upholding warrantless search of automobile towed to police ga-
rage for parking violations); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (upholding warrantless
arrest of defendant seen on her front porch and arrested after having fled inside); United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (upholding warrantless arrest in public place despite sufficient time to
obtain warrant and finding defendant's consent to search automobile valid although made while
in custody); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (upholding warrantless search of exterior of
automobile seized from private lot after defendant's arrest); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973) (upholding warrantless search incident to arrest in which officer had sole discretion
whether arrest would be full custody); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (upholding
warrantless search of contents of cigarette pack as incident to full custody arrest); Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (upholding warrantless seizure based on uncorroborated information
from informant). But see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978) (decision, announced
week after Barlow's, holding newspaper's files subject to search pursuant to valid warrant al-
though paper in no way suspected of any illegality).
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struck between the individuars right to privacy and the public's interest
in regulation. By not opening the gates of all businesses engaged in
interstate commerce to government inspectors, but yet applying the
more lenient administrative probable cause standard, Barlow's will al-
low the Court to seek that proper balance.
H. BRYAN IVES, III
Constitutional Law-Rights of the Mentally Retarded:
Haderman v. Pennhurst Closes State Institution and
Mandates Community Care
Until the middle of this century the mentally retarded, neglected
by the medical profession, were routinely consigned for life to isolated
institutions.' During the last two decades, however, medical advances
regarding the capabilities and treatment of the retarded2 have spurred
judicial recognition of the rights of that institutionalized population.
Recent cases have held, principally on the basis of the eighth and four-
teenth amendments, that institutionalized retardates possess a right to
habilitation-the education, training, and care required by mentally re-
tarded individuals to reach their maximum development.'
This right to habilitation was first recognized and applied in Wyatt
v. Sticlney4 to mandate minimum standards of care and supervision
I. An excellent discussion of the historical treatment of the mentally retarded appears in
Mason & Menolascino, The Right to Treatment for Mental, Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal
and Scientjfe Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 124 (1976).
2. Id. at 136-43. A recent paper credits "mid-twentieth century discoveries (or redis-
coveries) of the capacities of disabled people, of teaching and learning techniques to evoke those
capacities and the more or less wide distribution of knowledge of those techniques among school
people and other service agents in our society." T. Gilhool & E. Sturtman, Integration of Severely
Handicapped Students: Toward Criteria for Implementing and Enforcing the Integration Impera-
tive of P.L. 94-142 and Section 504, at 7 (1978) (unpublished paper for Public Interest Law Center
of Philadelphia).
3. Habilitation is defined in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395 app. (M.D. Ala. 1972),
as
the process by which the staff of the institution assists the resident to acquire and main-
tain those life skills which enable him to cope more effectively with the demands of his
own person and of his environment and to raise the level of his physical, mental, and
social efficiency. Habilitation includes but is not limited to programs of formal, struc-
tured education and treatment.
4. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971); 344 F. Supp. 373
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (right to treatment for mentally ill); 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (right to
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within the institution.' Recently, in Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hospital,6 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania went one significant step further and found
Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a large, isolated state institution
for the mentally retarded,7 inherently incapable of providing its resi-
dents the minimally adequate habilitation that courts in previous cases"
had ordered the institutions to provide. Instead of requiring improve-
ments in the institution's staffing, programming, and funding, the court
directed that Pennhurst be closed and that suitable facilities in the com-
munity9 be provided for all its residents.10
The Pennhurst plaintiffs, originally all retarded residents of the in-
stitution, brought a class action 1 seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief, including the closing of Pennhurst, and damages 12 on the ground
that they were being denied their right to habilitation. They claimed
habilitation for mentally retarded), affd in part, rev'dinpart sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (Wyatt is a series of decisions with the same style).
5. 344 F. Supp. 387, 395-407 app. (M.D. Ala. 1972). For a discussion of the minimum
standards in Wyatt, see note 53 infra.
6. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), stay denied, 451 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Pa. 1978), appeal
docketed, No. 78-148 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 1978).
7. Pennhurst, located 30 miles from Philadelphia, was built in 1908,446 F. Supp. at 1302, at
the height of the out-of-sight, out-of-mind philosophy of treatment for the retarded. Id. at 1299-
300.
8. See, e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), af'dinpart, vacatedinpart,
550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
9. Alternative community facilities can take many forms, supplying a great variety of resi-
dential options and support services that represent a continuum of models from the least restric-
tive to the the highly structured. Among the possible residential options are developmental
homes; intensive training residences for children, for adolescents, and for adults; family living
residences; adult minimum supervision residences; room and board homes; adult boarding; cluster
apartments; independent living with available counseling; five-day residences; behavior-shaping
residences; developmental maximization units; crisis assistance units; crisis homes; structured cor-
rectional residences; and structured rehabilitation residences. See Glenn, The Least Restrictive
Alternative in Residential Care and the Principle of Normalization, in PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 499, 507-12 (1976).
All of these facilities afford the mentally retarded some degree of contact with normal community
living patterns, primarily because of their location within the community but also because of their
smaller size and less rigid structure.
Expert testimony showed that all the retarded at Pennhurst, even the most severely handi-
capped, were capable of benefiting from community-centered facilities. 446 F. Supp. at 1312.
10. 446 F. Supp. at 1320, 1326.
11. The plaintiff class of retarded persons was defined as "[alil persons who as of May 30,
1974, and at any time subsequent, have been or may become residents of Pennhurst State School
and Hospital." This included residents, those who were on a waiting list for placement at Penn-
hurst, and those who, "because of the unavailability of alternate services in the community,"
might have been placed at Pennhurst. Id. at 1300.
12. Id. at 1298, 1324.
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violations of both state1 3 and federal 14 statutes and the first, eighth,
ninth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution."'
Defendants-Pennhurst, its supervisor and employees, the Penn-
sylvania Department of Public Welfare, and various state and county
officials'--denied that conditions at Pennhurst violated its residents'
constitutional or statutory rights.17 They agreed, however, that Penn-
hurst's staff of 1,500 was extremely inadequate for its patient popula-
tion of 1,230, seventy-four percent of whom were profoundly
retarded, 8 and admitted that they already had plans for a drastic re-
duction of the population, 19 although their timetable for the eventual
closing of the institution was "vague and indefinite.""z
Finding that minimally adequate habilitation is properly provided
only by living arrangements as much like a normal family living situa-
tion as possible 2 the court concluded that because of institutional con-
ditions antithetical to this "normalization" principle,2z "minimally
adequate habilitation cannot be provided in an institution such as
Pennhurst."23 The court entered judgment for plaintiffs; defendants
13. Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1967) (repealed in part in 1976; application to mentally retarded unaffected).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1986, 6010 (1970).
15. 446 F. Supp. at 1298 nn. 2 & 3.
16. Id. at 1301-02 & 1301 n.13.
17. Id. at 1313.
18. Id. at 1302-03. The institutional population was very similar to that in other institutions
for the retarded. Ferleger, The Future of Institutions for Retarded Citizens: The Promise of the
Pennhurst Case, in MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE LAW: A REPORT ON STATUS OF CURRENT
COURT CASES 28, 32 (1978) (compilation prepared for President's Committee on Mental
Retardation).
19. 446 F. Supp. at 1306.
20. Id. at 1325.
21. See also note 41 and accompanying text infra.
22. 446 F. Supp. at 1318. Much of the court's opinion is a catalog of institutional horrors. In
32 days of testimony, id. at 1300, and eight pages of the opinion, id. at 1303-Il, the problems at
Penhurst were set forth. Implicitly measuring Permhurst against the detailed minimum institu-
tional standards developed by the federal district court in Wyatt v. Stickney for Partlow Hospital
for the mentally retarded, see note 53 infra, Judge Broderick found that "[rany of the problems
at Pennhurst result from overcrowding and understaffing." 446 F. Supp. at 1303. The problems
included: lack of privacy and forced conformity to an inflexible institutional schedule; inadequa-
cies in the supervised, directed activities that are termed programming (the average amount of
beneficial programming was 15 minutes per day); severe lack of physical therapy and equipment
such as wheelchairs and hearing aids; inadequate "exit" and "program" plans (individual reports,
regularly updated and central to the habilitative effort, that evaluate the residents' needs and
goals, ways to achieve the goals, the residents' progress, and prospects for return to the commu-
nity); overuse of physical restraints, seclusion, and tranquilizing psychotropic medication; lack of
sanitation; deterioration of residents' earlier-acquired skills; and frequent injury to residents
through self-abuse, attacks by other inmates, and occasional mistreatment by staff members. Id.
at 1303-10.
23. Id. at 1318; see text accompanying notes 61-68 infra.
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were permanently enjoined to provide suitable community living ar-
rangements for all members of the plaintiff class, to monitor that provi-
sion, and to develop and periodically review individualized program
plans for each class member.24 A special master was appointed to de-
velop for submission to the court detailed plans for necessary commu-
nity facilities, including various types of small-scale, in-community
residences and support services, as well as plans for the interim opera-
tion of Pennhurst.25 Pennhurst was to be closed as soon as alternative
community facilities could be provided for all its residents.
The Pennhurst court found the right to habilitation26 to be based
on various independent constitutional and statutory grounds. First, the
right is grounded in due process. The only permissible justification for
institutionalizing retardates is the state's parenspatriae interest in pro-
viding them with care and treatment. If habilitation is not provided,
then the nature and duration of the commitment bears no reasonable
relation to its purpose and the due process clause is violated.27 Fur-
thermore, because fundamental individual liberties (for example,
travel, association, privacy, marriage, and procreation) are compro-
mised by commitment and institutionalization, the institutionalized re-
tarded have a right to enjoy habilitation under the least restrictive
24. 446 F. Supp. at 1326. Defendants were also enjoined from admitting anyone else to Pen-
nhurst and from counseling admission. Id. at 1327-28.
25. Pursuant to the interim operation plan, the court enjoined defendants to exert maximum
effort in following Department of Public Welfare regulations concerning use of physical and
chemical restraints and seclusion. Id. at 1328. Defendants were ordered to provide medical serv-
ices, wheelchairs, and adequate sanitation; they were also prohibited from administering drugs as
punishment or for convenience, among other things. Id. at 1329.
Defendants have appealed. No. 78-148 (2d Cir. docketed Apr. 25, 1978). The state moved
for a stay of judgment pending appeal, 451 F. Supp. 233, 235 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Judge Broderick
denied the motion because movant failed to make the four-part showing necessary for success.
Judge Broderick's comments in examining the first two parts of the necessary showing are impor-
tant in assessing the future of the Pennhurst decision: (I) Likelihood of success on appeal. Mo-
vant characterized the court's decision as "novel and precedent setting, both in the rights
enunciated and the scope of relief granted." Id. at 235-36. The court disagreed, pointing out that
its judgment was based on several legal theories, any one of which was sufficient to sustain it, and
most of which have been previously accepted. (2) Irreparable injury to movant. The state
claimed that the expenditure required by the order would be enormous. The court, however,
pointed out that the state had intended to close Pennhurst before litigation and, in addition, had
the benefit of Law of Nov. 27, 1970, no. 256, § 2AX(21), 1970 Pa. Laws 773, which appropriated
21 million dollars for moving Pennhurst residents into new community facilities. Eighteen million
dollars of this appropriation was still untouched at the time of suit. Finally, testimony at trial had
shown that community facilities are about one-third as costly as institutions and that many retar-
dates in the community could earn substantial incomes, further reducing the cost to the state. 451
F. Supp. 233, 236-37 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
26. See text accompanying notes 70 & 75 infra.
27. 446 F. Supp. at 1315-16.
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conditions consistent with the purposes of commitment.28 This princi-
ple of the "least restrictive alternative" operates to tailor all infringe-
ments of personal liberties to conform closely to a legitimate
governmental purpose.
29
Second, the court found a basis for the right to habilitation in the
eighth and fourteenth amendments' implied guarantees of freedom
from harm.3  And finally the decision identified an equal protection
right to nondiscriminatory habilitation." The court analogized from
the decision in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania,32 which established the right of retarded children to
equal educational opportunity in the public school system in accord-
ance with the mainstreaming (normalization) principle.33 The court
concluded that the segregation of the mentally retarded in isolated in-
stitutions produces habilitative facilities that are separate and not
equal.34
In addition, the Pennhurst court found violations of title 50, sec-
tion 4201 of the Pennsylvania Statutes35 which provides that the Penn-
sylvania Department of Public Welfare is empowered "to assure within
the State the availability and equitable provision of adequate ...
28. Id. at 1319.
29. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960), the Court stated:
[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose can-
not be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed
in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
30. 446 F. Supp. at 1320. Previous courts have employed the guarantee of due process and
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to mandate improvements in harmful insti-
tutional conditions. See id. at 1316; note 56 infra.
31. 446 F. Supp. at 1321-22.
32. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
33. In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children, a three-judge panel that included
Judge Broderick determined that retarded children between the ages of four and twenty-one were
entitled under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to receive at least as much
education and training "appropriate to [their] learning capacities" as the state was giving to others.
Id. at 313. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), which was not cited by the
Pennhurst court, established the right to an equal education for children with all types of handi-
caps. Both cases cite Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for the proposition that
education, once the state undertakes "to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all
on equal terms." Id. at 493; see 348 F. Supp. at 875, 343 F. Supp. at 297.
34. 446 F. Supp. at 1322. Judge Broderick's analogy between the Philadelphia Associationfor
Retarded Children and Pennhurst situations appears to be based on the great similarity between
"education and training" and "habilitation." Because it is unable to provide minimally adequate
habilitation, Penhurst is unequal to state public school facilities. It is unable to provide mini-
mally adequate habilitation precisely because it is a separate facility. Id. at 1321.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4201 (Purdon 1967).
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mental retardation services for all who need them ... ,6 and of sec-
tion 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973,11 which provides in
pertinent part: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual...
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, . . be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. 3
8
Because the reasoning of the Pennhurst court is occasionally im-
precise and conclusory, examination of the earlier principal cases is
necessary to an understanding of the significance of the Pennhurst deci-
sion in the development of the law regarding the rights of the mentally
retarded. The movement to advance the rights of the mentally retarded
began in the early 1960's 39 with the rediscovery, after almost a cen-
tury'4 of the theory of normalization and the developmental
mode 4 1-practical expressions of the medical community's realization
that normal living patterns are, for the mentally retarded, both an
achievable goal and the means to that goal. With the determination
that the retarded can function in normal society came legal recognition
of their right to be afforded the training and opportunity to do so. Al-
though medical experts generally endorse the right to habilitation,42
case law is not yet unanimous.43
36. Id.; see 446 F. Supp. at 1322 (citing In re Joyce Z., No. 2035-69 (C.P. Allegheny County,
Pa., filed March 31, 1975)).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1970).
38. Id;see 446 F. Supp. at 1323. The court found that § 504 codified the constitutional right
to equal protection and conferred a private right of action. Id.
39. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 1, at 136.
40. Id. at 130-34. Early successful treatment techniques were forgotten when psychiatrists
turned their attention to psychotherapy for the mentally ill. Id.
41. Normalization, or mainstreaming, places the retarded individual in an environment that
resembles as much as possible an ordinary family situation, maximizing his ability to live in soci-
ety. See id. at 136 n.31. The developmental model is simply an outline of stages in human devel-
opment, reflecting the realization that mental retardates are capable of growth and change. Id. at
137 n.32. Essentially, the mentally retarded are considered developmentally delayed but far from
unable to function in society.
42. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 9.
43. See 446 F. Supp. at 1316-17 & 1316 n.52. The United States Supreme Court has not yet
recognized a right to habilitation for either the mentally retarded or the mentally ill. See Donald-
son v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (vacating opinion by Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
establishing mental patient's due process right "to receive such individual treatment as will give
him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition." 493 F.2d 507, 520
(5th Cir. 1974)). The Court awarded Donaldson his freedom on much narrower grounds, holding
that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a non-dangerous individual who is
capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible
family members or friends." 422 U.S. at 576. Cases decided in the Fifth Circuit on the basis of its
Donaldson opinion and before the Supreme Court decision, in particular Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), are still authoritative, however. See 446 F. Supp. at 1316 n.52.
There are two federal district court decisions that denied the existence of a right to habilita-
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Medical theory is important in cases in this area" for two reasons:
first, the proposition that the retarded are able to benefit from habilita-
tion is the medical foundation for the existence of the right to habilita-
tion; and second, the evolving medical theories about the capacities of
the retarded and what is best for them affect the scope and content of
the legal right. Pennhurst breaks new ground only on the second
point.45
Legal recognition of the right of the involuntarily committed men-
tally ill to treatment long preceded any attention to the plight of the
similarly situated mentally retarded.4' The first case to deal with the
rights of the institutionalized mentally ill, Rouse v. Cameron,47 was de-
cided on statutory grounds, but the court stated in dictum that involun-
tary commitment of the mentally ill without treatment might well
violate the constitutional provisions against cruel and unusual punish-
ment and deprivation of due process and equal protection of the laws.48
tion: Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d
1319 (5th Cir. 1974) (companion case to Wyatt v. Aderhot), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975); and
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y.
1973). In New York StateAssociationfor Retarded Children, the court found a constitutional right
to freedom from harm that did not rise to the level of a right to treatment. Id. at 758, 762. Later,
however, in approving a consent decree, the court appeared willing to modify that holding if
necessary. New York State Ass'n. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 719
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
The trend in the lower federal courts, however, clearly is toward recognition of the right to
habilitation. This is a rapidly growing area of the law, characterized by test case litigation. See
generally MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE LAW: A REPORT ON STATUS OF CURRENT COURT
CASES, supra note 18.
44. The Wyatt court explicitly recognized the importance of expert medical testimony about
"'new concepts in the field of mental retardation.'" 344 F. Supp. 387, 391 n.7 (quoting testimony
of Dr. Phillip Roos, Executive Director for the National Association for Retarded Children). In
Pennhurst Judge Broderick relied heavily on statistics and studies concerning, inter alia, the dele-
terious effect of institutionalization on the retarded, 446 F. Supp. at 1311, and the employability of
retardates in the community, id. at 1312. Many of the most important cases in this area have been
characterized by substantial agreement between plaintiffs and defendants and their respective ex-
perts. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1314 (5th Cir. 1974); 446 F. Supp. at 1313, 1325.
The Wyatt litigation was apparently conceived by plaintiffs and defendants together as a way to
extract more money from the Alabama legislature for what both sides considered to be essentials
of care and treatment. Right-to-habilitation cases often culminate in consent agreements, and the
same expert witnesses appear in almost every case.
45. See text accompanying notes 67 & 77 infra. Habilitation is commonly defined in theinstitutional ontext, see note 3 rupra, reflefting medical theory upon which the decision in Wyatt
was based.
46. Legal recognition began with an article asserting a due process right to treatment on
behalf of the civilly committed mentally ill. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 449
(1960). The author is a prominent New York City attorney and physician; his work produced an
enormous response in the literature.
47. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
48. Id. at 453. This statement contains the basic components of most constitutional argu-
ments for the right to treatment. The court also intimated that the right to treatment might be
violated not only by the giving of no treatment but also by the giving of treatment'inadequate in
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Wyatt v. Stickney, several decisions with the same style concerning
three institutions for the mentally ill and mentally retarded in Ala-
bama, applied the due process right-to-treatment principle to the men-
tally retarded simply by substituting "habilitation" for "treatment."
The Wyatt cases based the rights to treatment and habilitation on the
due process clause, reasoning that civil commitment entails a massive
curtailment of liberty49 that is prohibited by due process unless justified
by a permissible purpose.5" For the mentally retarded that purpose is
habilitation."1  The Wyatt decisions were directed at improving execra-
ble conditions within Alabama institutions.52 To that end, the Wyatt
court developed specific constitutional minima for both the institutions
for the mentally ill and the institutions for the mentally retarded.53
Wyatt also emphasized the importance of the normalization principle
for the retarded:
Residents shall have a right to the least restrictive conditions neces-
sary to achieve the purposes of habilitation. To this end, the institu-
tion shall make every attempt to move residents from (1) more to less
structured living; (2) larger to smaller facilities; (3) larger to smaller
living units; (4) group to individual residence; (5) segregated from the
community to integrated into the community living; (6) dependent to
independent livdng.5 4
In addition to echoing Wyatt's due process right to habilitation
under the least restrictive alternative, the later case of Welsch v.
light of present knowledge. See id. at 456-57. This inquiry necessitates the introduction of volu-
minous expert testimony which accordingly is extremely important in these cases.
49. 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1972); accord, Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509
(1972).
50. 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972); accord, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738
(1972).
51. "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confine-
ment is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the
very fundamentals of due process." 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
52. See note 44 supra.
53. 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Bryce and Searcy Hospitals for the mentally
ill); 344 F. Supp. 387, 395-407 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Partlow Hospital for the mentally retarded). The
guidelines generally included, among many other things, minimum staff size, minimum necessary
equipment, and limitations on use of restraints and drugs. They were intended by Judge Johnson
to effectuate his three fundamental conditions for adequate and effective treatment at public insti-
tutions: (1) a humane psychological and physical environment, (2) qualified staff in sufficient
number, and (3) individualized treatment plans. 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1971). The
Partlow guidelines were used by Judge Broderick in his evaluation of Pennhurst. 446 F. Supp. at
1303.
54. 344 F. Supp. 387, 396 app. (M.D. Ala. 1972). This invocation of the principle of the least
restrictive alternative, discussed in note 29 and accompanying text supra, represents judicial ac-
ceptance of the developmental model for the mentally retarded, by recognizing a potential in the
retardate for growth and improvement. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 1, at 149. It foreshad-
ows to a large extent the decision in Pennhurst.
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Likins"5 recognized that the institutionalized mentally retarded have
broad eighth amendment fights: the right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment in the form of conditions and practices that shock
the conscience,56 and the right to "humane and safe living while con-
fined under State authority."57
Although these cases were great advances for the interests of the
mentally retarded, they rested on the assumption that adequate habili-
tation could always be achieved within the institutional context.5 8
Some recent cases recognize that for certain individuals, institutions
can never provide adequate habilitation. These cases have held that
some institutionalized retardates, depending on their individually de-
termined needs, have the right to receive care in settings less restrictive
than those offered by large institutions.59 But Pennhurst is the first de-
cision to find that a particular institution could not adequately serve the
55. 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), a f'd inpart, vacated in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.
1977).
56. Id. at 496. Detention for mere status (here, mental retardation), without treatment, is
cruel and unusual punishment. This argument derives from Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (California law making it a crime to be narcotics addict violates eighth amendment).
57. This includes the freedom from harm, see New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children,
Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); note 43 supra, and the right to exercise,
outdoor activity, and basic hygiene, 373 F. Supp. at 502-03. The decree in Welsch was directed
solely toward improvement of institutional facilities.
58. Although Wyatt and Welsch are significant in their recognition of the principles of
normalization and the developmental model for the factual foundation of their formula-
tion of the constitutional right to habilitation, their approach can be considered only the
rudimentary beginning. The logic of normalization and the developmental model which
Wyatt and Welsch recognize suggests full implementation of habilitation can only be
achieved in a noninstitutional setting. Institutions, by their very structure-a closed and
segregated society founded on obsolete custodial models-can rarely normalize and ha-
bilitate the mentally retarded citizen to the extent of community programs created and
modeled upon the normalization and developmental approach components of habilita-
tion. Neither Wyatt nor Welsch fully implemented the right to habilitation in that they
failed to challenge the very existence of the institution. Consequently, the two institu-
tional characteristics most antithetical to the application of the normalization principle
remain intact: segregation from the community and the total sheltering of retarded citi-
zens in all spheres of their lives.
Mason & Menolascino, supra note 1, at 156.
59. Plaintiff in Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71 (D. Neb. 1973), challenged, on equal pro-
tection grounds, the placement of some involuntarily committed mental retardates in institutions
while others were placed in community-based facilities. Mason and Menolascino, supra note 1, at
164, contend that "the thrust of the Horacek complaint was the continued legitimacy of the insti-
tution" and that it was "aimed at dismantling the institution." The suit did not succeed in this
aim.
Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975), was a class action brought by inmates
of a mental hospital- the case was decided on statutory grounds, although plaintiffs also raised
constitutional issues. The court held that the hospital had the duty to provide the least restrictive
habilitative settings for its inmates, including noninstitutional community-based facilities. Al-
though this decision was intended to entail a drastic reduction in the institutional population, the
hospital itself was not placed in jeopardy. The court held: "[These plaintiffs have a right to the
treatment sought in this action where the Hospital has determined that such treatment is appropri-
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needs of any of its residents, without regard to the severity of their
handicaps. It has succeeded in shifting the focus of the habilitative ef-
fort from the institution to the community by declaring "institutions
such as Pennhurst" incapable of providing minimally adequate habili-
tation for any mentally retarded persons.60  Although essentially a
straightforward endorsement of the principles of the previous cases,
Pennhurst, by requiring closure of the institution, has, nevertheless,
gone far beyond those cases. The opinion will undoubtedly have great
impact, precipitating efforts to close other institutions and making pos-
sible right-to-habilitation litigation in noninstitutional contexts.
In the effort to close other institutions, future litigants will need to
know why Pennhurst was closed and the extent to which the court's
reasons are applicable to those other institutions. Judge Broderick sim-
ply held: "[O]n the basis of this record we find that minimally adequate
habilitation cannot be provided in an institution such as Pennhurst. 61
The reach of the holding, therefore depends upon what "an institution
such as Pennhurst" is, an inquiry to which the opinion gives no clear
answer.
62
It is arguable that the opinion should be read to condemn all pub-
lic institutions. Certain of the characteristics that induced Judge Brod-
erick to label Penmhurst constitutionally inadequate presumably are
typical of most institutions. Indeed, commentators cited in the court's
opinion identify certain common institutional characteristics that they
believe should be fatal for any institution that possesses them. One
article stresses the "segregation from the community and the total shel-
tering of retarded citizens in all spheres of their lives." 63 Another refers
to "existing large-scale geographically remote institutions"'  as the
ones that must close. The Pennhurst opinion focuses on similar attrib-
utes that are inherent in the institutional setting and antithetical to ha-
ate." Id. at 978. The hospital had determined, however, that only 43% of the plaintiff class cur-
rently required care and treatment in alternate facilities.
60. 446 F. Supp. at 1318.
61. Id.
62. Interview with H. Rutherford Turnbull, Associate Professor, Institute of Government,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (September 8, 1978).
63. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 1, at 156-57, quoted in 446 F. Supp. at 1318.
64. Burt, Beyondthe Right to Habilitation, in PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETAR-
DATION, supra note 9, at 418, 427, 432 (1976) (footnote omitted), quoted in 446 F. Supp. at 1321:
[E]xisting large-scale geographically remote institutions cannot by their nature provide
adequate programs to remedy the intellectual and emotional shortcomings and the gall-
ing social stigma that led the retarded residents to these institutions.... A powerful
case can thus be mounted that courts should command states to use extraordinary effort
to avoid institutionalizing retarded citizens.
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bilitation: lack of privacy, enforced conformity to a rigid schedule,
isolation from normal society, confinement, and group living.65 None
of these, however, is specifically identified as a decisive factor.
The court also devotes much of the opinion to the gross deficien-
cies in staffing, equipment, and funding at Pennhurst. Although courts
in earlier cases, like Wyatt and Welsch, chose to cure, not close, institu-
tions with similar problems, the presence or absence of such defects
should not bear on the closure question.66 Clearly these particular de-
fects could have been remedied less drastically than by institutional
closure.
Because it appears, therefore, that closure was mandated by char-
acteristics inherent in the institution, Pennhurst plainly represents ini-
tial judicial recognition of the medical community's realization that
application of the normalization principle demands less restrictive set-
tings than can be achieved within the confines of traditional residential
institutions.67 Pennhurst has not, however, made plain what combina-
tion of inherent characteristics add up to a defective institution. There-
fore, case-by-case adjudication must in the future determine whether a
given institution is enough like Pennhurst to invite the Pennhurst rem-
edy. Because of the wide range of institutional and community care
models that exists, there is enormous potential for such future litiga-
tion; Pennhurst may therefore be a long way from "sound[ing] the
death knell for institutions for the retarded." '68
65. See, e.g., 446 F. Supp. at 1303, 1319.
66. There was some testimony at trial that it would be cheaper to close Pennhurst than to
cure it, see 446 F. Supp. at 1312, but this is certainly not the rationale for the court's decision. Nor
is the argument that plaintiffs would accept nothing less than the closing of the institution, see
Ferleger, supra note 18, at 29, sufficient, since Judge Broderick was not bound by their demands.
67. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 1, at 146.
68. Ferleger, supra note 18, at 28 (quoting statement of Judge Broderick made at trial).
Frank Laski, an attorney for Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens in the Pennhurst
litigation, disagrees. Pointing out that a study for the President's Committee on Mental Retarda-
tion ranked Pennsylvania one of the top states in efforts to provide better institutional care, he
reasons, "While there certainly are some mental retardation facilities that could claim some im-
provement over Pennhurst, they are not improvements that make a difference, and none can avoid
the equal protection implications of the Pennhurst decision and order." He names some charac-
teristics, essentially those named by Judge Broderick, that are significantly more prevalent in insti-
tutions than in group homes, and concludes:
While there are important implications in the Pennhurst opinion and order for all large-
scale, segregated institutions housing disabled persons, it is necessary to keep in mind
that the decision and order are based on a factual record about a single mental
retardation institution, and the application of the law of the case depends entirely on the
similarity of the institution in question to Pennhurst and the ability to establish the cen-
tral factual foundation that was established in the Pennhurst case, i.e., that no one need
be kept there, and that given less restrictive arrangements (community facilities), all
could live in the community. On this analysis the direct implication of Pennhurst is
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As the first decision to close an institution and mandate the crea-
tion of community care facilities for all its residents, Pennhurst will in-
variably produce future litigation seeking to secure the right to
minimally adequate habilitation for residents, not of institutions, but of
community care facilities.69 Pennhurst does not reach this issue, be-
cause it, like all previous cases, is concerned only with an already insti-
tutionalized population. Moreover, the court's narrow holding implies
limitations on the right to habilitation that, although not inappropriate
in the past, could make the right difficult to apply in noninstitutional
settings.
The court states its holding as follows: "[W]hen a state involunta-
rily commits retarded persons it must provide them with such habilita-
tion as will afford them a reasonable opportunity to acquire and
maintain those life skills necessary to cope as effectively as their capaci-
ties permit."7 The first problem with applying this holding to the
noninstitutional setting is that it is stated in terms of commitment.
Since commitment in the earlier cases was always to a Pennhurst-like
institution, commitment became equated with institutionalization.71
And because all the institutionalized plaintiffs had been deprived of
many fundamental rights by civil commitment, the right to habilitation
was always characterized as contingent upon the threat of severe depri-
vation of liberty. 2 Thus, placement in a community facility might be
construed as not involving commitment with consequent loss of liberty
sufficient to give rise to a right to habilitation. 71 Realistically, of
course, the requirement that the right to habilitation be implemented in
community care facilities assumes the existence of the right for persons
clear., it sounds the death knell for all public mental retardation institutions in the
country.
Laski, Right to Services in the Community Implications ofthe Pennhurst Case, HEALTH L. PROJECT
LIB. BULL., May 1978, at 1, 5-7.
69. "It would be naive to think that community programs will escape the problems that
plagued [institutions]." Halpern, The Right to Habilitation, in PRESIDENT'S COMMITrEE ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 9, at 401 (1976).
70. 446 F. Supp. at 1317-18.
71. Retardates can of course be committed to foster homes and other community care facili-
ties, in addition to the more common institutional commitment. P. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF
MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONs: AN AMERICAN CIvIL LIBERTIS UNION HANDBOOK 31 (1976).
72. See notes 49 & 50 and accompanying text supra; 446 F. Supp. at 1315.
73. The danger might become particularly acute when no institutions exist as alternatives to
community care. Before Pennhurst an individual committed to a community facility had the right
to habilitation because the mere existence of the institution, to which he could be committed at
any time, represented a significant threat to his liberty. After this decision, however, a committed
person potentially no longer faces even the threat of institutionalization, since the institution may
no longer exist.
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in those facilities. Nevertheless, the traditional narrow formulation of
the right upon which Pennhurst relies is not without potential for "un-
realistic" challenges based upon the application of its language to new
settings.
The court's holding also refers only to involuntary, as opposed to
voluntary, commitment, thereby placing another potential limitation
on the applicability of Pennhurst. Some courts have held that the free-
dom to leave an institution at any time (an attribute of voluntary com-
mitment at least in theory) eliminates the need for a right to
habilitation by giving the retardate power to restore at will his lost lib-
erty. Ways were therefore devised to equate the voluntarily with the
involuntarily committed, in order to secure for the voluntarily commit-
ted protection of the right.74 These devices have been so consistently
used in the past that any distinction between voluntary and involuntary
commitment ought for these purposes simply to be eliminated.
In dictum, the Pennhurst opinion refers to the right to habilitation
in broader terms than used in its holding. This broader statement of
the right avoids the potential problem areas in the court's specific for-
mulation of its holding. The court stated, "[W]henever a state accepts
retarded individuals into its facilities it cannot create or maintain those
facilities in a manner which deprives those individuals of the basic ne-
cessities of life."75 This formulation, by avoiding the involuntary com-
mitment language, requires that mere acceptance of the retardate into
the state's hands triggers the right to habilitation, regardless of the
amount of deprivation afforded by different kinds of care and regard-
less of the involuntary or voluntary cooperation of the retardate. In
addition, the right as so stated is applicable to all state facilities, thus
making plain that the right to habilitation exists for those in commu-
nity care even after the closing of the institution has eliminated the
74. One device, used by the court in Wyatt, is to assume that all residents are in the institu-
tion involuntarily, leaving the burden on defendants to show that some are there voluntarily. 344
F, Supp. 387, 390 n.5 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Another is to establish the right to habilitation for invol-
untarily committed retardates and then extend the right to voluntarily committed inmates of the
same institution on an equal protection basis. Halpern, supra note 69, at 396; Mason & Menolas-
cino, supra note 1, at 158; Murdock, CI IRights of the Mentally Retarded- Some Critical Issues, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 133, 153-61 (1972). Pennhurst employed two strategies. One was to argue
that, practically speaking, there is no such thing as voluntary commitment, because (1) few retar-
dates make the choice themselves--rather, their parents make the choice for them, and (2) even
could they themselves choose institutionalization, the absence of alternative placements or com-
munity facilities seriously compromises the true voluntariness of such commitments. 446 F. Supp.
at 1310-11, 1318. The other strategy was the broad statement of the habilitation right, avoiding
the use of the involuntary-voluntary distinction. Id. at 1318.
75. 446 F. Supp. at 1318. Judge Broderick emphasized that for the retarded the necessities
include minimally adequate habilitation.
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threat of institutionalization. And because it does not mention commit-
ment at all, but rather makes the right to habilitation contingent only
upon acceptance, the broader formulation provides that the existence
of the right is not affected by the exercise of the state's commitment
function.76 The Pennhurst holding was designed for a system of treat-
ment through involuntary commitment, because no more was required
under the facts of the case; the broader statement, however, may pro-
tect all those in the care of the state, even after future changes in treat-
ment theories, facilities, and practices.77
Even if Pennhurst's broad statement in dictum of the right to ha-
bilitation were taken as authoritative, the decision would not establish
the right as constitutionally fundamental. The court states firmly, "No
constitutional mandate has been called to our attention which would
require a state to provide habilitation for its retarded citizens."7" Just
as education is not a fundamental right,7 9 and its provision is a duty
voluntarily undertaken by the state, so is the provision of facilities for
the retarded. Yet the right to habilitation seems no less secure than the
right to public education-and as states are not likely to close their
schools, neither are they likely to close their community facilities.8 0
The Pennhurst decision is likely to be upheld on appeal.81 The
76. Judge Broderick is opposed to commitment "[Tihis Court entertains serious doubts as to
whether retarded individuals should ever be subjected to 'commitment' ... ." Id. at 1315.
According to the court's narrow holding, if a state were to discontinue this commitment func-
tion, the right of habilitation would no longer exist. This is consistent with the notion that com-
mitment, even to a noninstitutional setting, entails some degree of pervasive and continuing state
control over the individual, including power over choice of facility and restriction of the freedom
to leave. Acceptance, on the other hand, seems to be offered as a more neutral term, perhaps
meaning merely the state's assumption of care.
77. The difficulty of separating medical from legal issues arises because it is the emerging
task of science to define the limits of the retardate's humanity for constitutional purposes; people
of ordinary intelligence had that done for them long ago, before anyone was worried about scien-
tific implementation of the guarantees of a free society.
78. 446 F. Supp. at 1318. The court relied on Welsch, which asserted: "The State is not
constitutionally obligated to provide services to its citizens," 373 F. Supp. at 498, and added: "It is
not disputed that the State could close its institutions for the mentally retarded without offending
the Constitution.' Id. at 499.
79. "Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our
Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected." San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
80. Murdock, supra note 74, at 161, points out that often the state has undertaken to provide
for the mentally retarded under itsparenspatriae power because of the recognized inability of the
private sector to do so. This is especially true since decisions like Pennsylvania Associationfor
Retarded Children and Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), see note 33 supra,
have highlighted the importance of educational and other opportunities for the retarded.
81. See generally note 25 supra. It is not unlikely, however, that its most interesting argu-
ment, the equal protection basis for the right to habilitation, will not survive. Essentially, the
equal protection argument depends on recognition of mental retardation as at least a semisuspect
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practical results of the decision will not, of course, be apparent for
some time, given the enormous problems in implementing the compli-
cated orders issued in right-to-habilitation decisions.8" Pennhurst's im-
portance, however, lies in its potentially broad application in future
litigation more than in its results for the particular institution. First,
and least controversially, Pennhurst is another in a growing number of
cases recognizing the institutionalized retardates' right to habilitation.
Second, it provides authority for a new means of achieving habilita-
tion-complete closure of the institution and substitution of commu-
nity care facilities-based upon judicial recognition of changes in
medical theory about what constitutes minimally adequate habilitation
for the retarded. Pennhurst will undoubtedly be a potent and often-
used weapon for the institutionalized retarded; however, because it is
not a precisely formulated decision, it may not be a weapon easy to
wield. And finally, Pennhurst at least begins a redefinition of the cir-
cumstances giving rise to the right to habilitation. Such a redefinition
is necessary to establish the applicability and scope of the right to ha-
bilitation in the noninstitutional contexts that will be created by the
condemnation of institutions and the consequent widespread establish-
ment of community facilities. Because Pennhurst serves not only as a
blueprint for future litigation but as a warning about the constitutional-
ity of future provision of facilities for the mentally retarded, its influ-
ence ought to be far-reaching.
NANCY M. P. KING
Tort Law-Norton v. United States: Federal Government's
Liability Coterminous with That of Its Agents Under
Federal Tort Claims Act Amendment
Prior to the 1970's a United States citizen had no remedy against
the United States Government or individual federal law enforcement
classification requiring heightened judicial scrutiny, see, e.g., Mason & Menolascino, supra note 1,
at 160-64; this intermediate scrutiny in equal protection cases is not yet an established test.
82. See, ag., Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional
Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975). Most of the important cases are all still struggling with imple-
mentation and challenge of their courts' orders. See generally MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE
LAW: A REPORT ON STATUS OF CURRENT COURT CAsEs, supra note 18; cases cited note 59 supra.
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agents for the "constitutional torts"1 of these agents. In 1971, however,
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,2 the United States Supreme Court held that a cause of ac-
tion existed against individual federal officers for fourth amendment
violations;3 on remand the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit determined that the agent would be liable when he had not
acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief that his actions were
lawful.4 Moreover, in 1974 Congress amended the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA),5 which had limited the United States' waiver of sovereign
immunity to the negligent torts of federal employees,6 to make the fed-
eral government independently liable for many intentional torts com-
mitted by its law enforcement agents.7 In Norton v. United States' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was faced with
the question whether the United States was able to assert the good faith
and reasonable belief of its agents, a defense that the agents could indi-
vidually claim, as a defense in a lawsuit against the Government for a
fourth amendment violation committed by federal agents. Reversing
the trial court, the court held that the Government could use as a de-
fense to the action the good faith and reasonable belief of its agents.9
On March 15, 1975, the Alexandria, Virginia police received an
anonymous tip that Patricia Hearst, a nationally-sought fugitive, was
1. "Constitutional torts" are tortious acts that violate an individual's constitutional rights.
The most typical infringements by government agents involve fourth or fifth amendment rights.
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
3. Id. at 397.
4. 456 F.2d 1339, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972). Recently, in Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978),
the Supreme Court acknowledged that under Bivens federal officers were not entitled to an abso-
lute or unqualified immunity for their actions.
5. Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(Supp. V 1975)). Through this Act the United States became liable only for the negligent acts or
omissions of federal employees; the Act did not make the government liable for any intentional
torts committed by its agents.
6. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, § 421, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
7. The amendment explicitly makes the federal government liable for some types of offenses
that were exempt under the original Act. The language of the amendment reads as follows:
Provided That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement of-
ficers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment
of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process,
or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law en-
forcement officer" means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to
execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. V 1975).
8. 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3383 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1978) (No. 78-
461).
9. Id. at 397.
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hiding in an Alexandria apartment. Acting on this tip, several FBI
agents, in conjunction with local officers, went to plaintiff's apartment
without seeking or obtaining a search warrant.' 0 Plaintiff Norton was
residing alone in the apartment at that time.I The agents knocked on
the door and orally identified themselves, whereupon plaintiff informed
them that she would call their office to verify their identities. 2 As she
attempted to call for verification, the officers began to strike the door in
an attempt to open it forcibly. Fearing her door would be destroyed,
Norton removed the catch and the agents entered with weapons
drawn.1 3 After an exhaustive search of plaintiffs apartment uncovered
no evidence of Hearst, the agents realized their tip had been
inaccurate.'
4
Plaintiff instituted an action against the local agents based on 42
U.S.C. § 198315 and against the federal officers directly under the
fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 6 In addi-
tion, she filed suit against the United States under the FTCA, as
amended.' 7 Both the local and federal officers defended their actions
on the ground that they acted in good faith and with reasonable belief
that their actions were lawful.' 8 The United States also defended on
the ground that its agents had acted in good faith and with a reasonable
belief in the lawfulness of their actions.' 9 On cross-motions for sum-
10. Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138, 142 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.
1978).
11. Local police, using telephone locator crisscrosses, thought the apartment was occupied by
a man whom they had investigated for carrying a concealed weapon. That person, however, had
vacated the apartment over five months earlier, at which time plaintiff had moved in. Id. at 141-
42.
12. The details of this interchange were disputed, but both parties agreed that at no time did
Norton view the credentials of the officers. Id. at 142.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
16. 581 F.2d at 392.
17. The specific provisions on which she based her suit were 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674,
2680(h) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 427 F. Supp. 138, 140 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd, 581 F.2d 390 (4th
Cir. 1978). Section 1346(b) is the basic jurisdictional statute for federal tort claims, § 2674 sets
forth the scope of federal liability under the FTCA, and § 2680(h) eliminated the exclusion of
Government liability for the intentional torts of its employees. The text of § 2680(h) appears in
note 7 supra.
18. 581 F.2dat 392.
19. Id.
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mary judgment tile district court determined that the actions of the law
enforcement officers violated plaintiff's fourth amendment rights be-
cause the officers had no probable cause to believe that Hearst was
present.2 0 The court concluded, however, that because further fact-
finding was necessary with regard to the good faith and reasonable be-
lief defense of the agents, summary judgment against the individual
agents was inappropriate.21 The court entered summary judgment
against the United States, however, on the ground that the United
States could not, as a matter of law, assert the good faith defense of its
agents in an action brought under the FTCA.22 Subsequently, the suit
against the individual local and federal officers was dismissed and
judgment was entered against the United States.3
On appeal the Government did not contest the district court's find-
ing that a fourth amendment violation had occurred,24 nor did it dis-
pute the application of the FTCA and 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) 21 to the
action.26 The sole issue on appeal was whether the Government could
raise in defense the good faith and reasonable belief of its agents.27
Relying exclusively on the legislative history of the amendment to sec-
tion 2680(h),28 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed the trial court and held that because there was no clear
statement of a legislative policy to expand the Government's vicarious
liability beyond the scope of the agent's direct liability, the court should
not impose liability on the federal government when its agents have
acted in good faith with a reasonable belief in the legality of their
actions.29
Tort actions have been available against state officials who violate
the constitutional rights of citizens since Congress passed section
1983.30 Recently this liability has been extended to suits against munic-
ipalities.31 The liability of the United States and its individual agents
20. 427 F. Supp. 138, 144 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1978).
21. Id. at 146.
22. Id. at 152.
23. See 581 F.2d at 392.
24. Id.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. V 1975).
26. 581 F.2d at 392.
27. Id. at 393.
28. Id. at 395 n.7.
29. Id. at 397.
30. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970),
quotedin note 15 supra). For examples of actions brought under this statute, see Sorenson, Quasi-
Judicial Immunity: Its Scope and Limitations in Section 1983 Actions, 1976 DUKE L.J. 95.
31. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
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for violation of constitutional rights has also been a recent develop-
ment. The liability of individual federal agents arose out of Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, in which
the Supreme Court held a cause of action to exist against federal law
enforcement officers who violate citizens' fourth amendment rights.32
Under Bivens victims of this constitutional tort are entitled to recover
money damages against individual federal agents for injuries suffered
as a result of the agent's violation of the amendment.33 On remand the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
individual officer could escape liability by showing that he had a good
faith and reasonable belief that his actions were legal under the circum-
stances.34 Without this defense law enforcement agents would be in-
hibited in performing their discretionary duties by the possibility of
civil lawsuits.3
Originally the FTCA waived sovereign immunity36 only for the
negligent torts of federal employees; the Government retained its im-
munity for intentional torts committed by its law enforcement agents.
Realizing that judgments against individual officers would often pro-
duce no recovery, Congress amended the FTCA in 1974, making the
United States liable for the intentional torts of its agents. The language
of the amendment does not specifically delineate the scope of the Gov-
ernment's liability, however. The court in Norton, interpreting the stat-
ute, held that "the liability of the United States under section 2680(h) is
coterminous with the liability of its agents under Bivens,' '37 and there-
32. 403 U.S. at 389.
33. Id. at 397.
34. 456 F.2d 1339, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972). The court explained that this defense consisted of two
distinct parts: first, a subjective good faith belief in the legality of the officer's actions; and second,
an objective standard of the reasonableness of that belief under all of the circumstances. Id. at
1348.
35. Many cases and commentators have pointed out the necessity of freeing law enforcement
officers from pressures of civil lawsuits.
We are called upon in this case to weigh in a particular context two considerations of
high importance which now and again come into sharp conflict-on the one hand, the
protection of the individual citizen against pecuniary damage caused by oppressive or
malicious action on the part of officials of the Federal Government; and on the other, the
protection of the public interest by shielding responsible governmental officers against
the harassment and inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits brought
on account of action taken in the exercise of their official responsibilities.
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 564-65 (1959). See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF Tonis § 29.14 (1956).
36. For a general treatment of the development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Inmunity, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1963);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
37. 581 F.2d at 393.
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fore permitted the Government to retain immunity when its agents ac-
ted in good faith and with a reasonable belief.
The court rejected the arguments presented by both plaintiff and
defendant at the trial court level."8 Two other approaches were avail-
able to the court, however. Because the original FTCA made the Gov-
ernment liable for negligence "under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accord-
ance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,"3 9
the courts have traditionally looked to a particular state's doctrine of
respondeat superior in determining the liability of the United States in
FTCA cases. 4° In Norton, however, the court rejected this traditional
state law negligence approach to FTCA cases because constitutional
torts based on the fourth amendment were essentially questions of fed-
eral law.41 Finding the issue of federal liability under the amendment
sui generis,42 the court resolved to rely upon the intent of Congress in
enacting the amendment to ascertain the extent of the waiver of sover-
eign immunity.43
The specific language considered by the court to be controlling ap-
pears in a Senate Report that accompanied the amendment to section
38. The court explicitly rejected the policy arguments relied upon by the lower court to hold
the good faith and reasonable belief defense unavailable. The district court distinguished the
justification for qualified individual immunity from that of sovereign immunity. The former is
based on protecting a public servant from fear of civil lawsuit while performing his official duties,
while the latter was transplanted from a feudalistic system based on the divine right of kings,
suggesting that the rationale for sovereign immunity may no longer be applicable to tortious acts
by federal agents. 427 F. Supp. 138, 150-52 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1978).
The appellate court also refused to accept the arguments presented by the Government. 581 F.2d
at 395 n.8. The Government argued three alternative defenses. First, they argued that no tort was
committed at all because the agents did not act in bad faith or with an unreasonable belief. Sec-
ond, they suggested that imposing liability without regard to the motives of the individual agents
was tantamount to imposing absolute liability on the Government, which contravened two deci-
sions of the Supreme Court. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972); Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15 (1953). Finally, the Government argued that the good faith and reasonable belief
defense constituted a privilege rather than an immunity, thereby making the defense available to
the principal under the respondeat superior doctrine. For a discussion of the respondeat superior
doctrine see note 40 and text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
40. Under a respondeal superior theory "both the precipitating tort and the scope of the gov-
ernment's vicarious liability were to be governed by 'the law of the [state] where the act or omis-
sion occurred."' 581 F.2d at 394 (citing Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 801 (1972)). See, e.g.,
James v. United States, 467 F.2d 832, 833 (4th Cir. 1972); Yates v. United States, 365 F.2d 663,
667 (4th Cir. 1966); Jennings v. United States, 291 F.2d 880 (4th Cir. 1961).
41. 581 F.2d at 394-95.
42. Id. at 395 n.8.
43. Id. at 394-95.
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2680(h).44 The passage stated:
[T]his provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case
and its progenty [sic], in that it waives the defense of sovereign im-
munity so as to make the Government independently liable in dam-
ages for the same type of conduct that is alleged to have occurred in
Bivens (and for which that case imposes liability upon the individual
Government officials involved).45
The court emphasized the parenthetical phrase and interpreted this
passage to be evidence of congressional intent to impose liability on the
Government only when liability is imposed on the individual defend-
ants in constitutional tort cases like Bivens.4 6
It seems, however, that the court did not give adequate weight to
the evidence from the legislative history that the intent of Congress in
submitting the legislation was indeed to expand the liability of the
United States in the Bivens-type case beyond the liability of the indi-
vidual defendant. First, the language of the amendment itself sug-
gested no limitation based on the individual liability of the agent.47
Taken literally, therefore, this waiver of immunity is intended to cover
all of the specified intentional torts of federal law enforcement officers
irrespective of their defenses.48
Moreover, there is ample evidence in the legislative record to sup-
port an argument that the liability of the United States should be
broader than the liability of the individual officer under Bivens. Senate
Report Number 93-588, 49 on which the majority in Norton relied,
stated that "the Committee amendment would submit the Government
to liability whenever its agents act under color of law so as to injure the
public through search and seizures that are conducted without warrants
or with warrants issued without probable cause."50 This passage makes
no reference to a defense of good faith and reasonable belief, and
clearly applies to the fact situation in Norton. Yet the court in Norton
attributed this language to "imprecise draftsmanship"'" and disre-
garded it.
There is other evidence in the legislative record that supports the
44. S. REP. No. 93-588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 2789.
45. Id. at 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2789, 2791.
46. 581 F.2d at 395.
47. See note 7 supra.
48. 581 F.2d at 398 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
49. S. REP. No. 93-588, supra note 44.
50. Id. at 4, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2789, 2791.
51. 581 F.2d at 396 n.12.
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conclusion that Congress intended to expand the liability of the United
States beyond the liability of the individual officers under Bivens. Sen-
ator Percy, in his remarks to the committee as sponsor of the amend-
ment, recognized that the Bivens remedy alone was inadequate because
it "is severely limited by the ease with which agents can usually estab-
lish the defense of having acted in good faith and with probable
cause." 52 Clearly implied in his statement was his intent to impose lia-
bility on the Government, even when the individual agent can success-
fully raise the defense of good faith and reasonable belief.53 Although
the majority in Norton recognized that this evidence was contrary to
their holding, they regarded it as insignificant. 54 The court also over-
looked evidence in the record that states explicitly that it was not the
intent of the Senate committee that sponsored the legislation to allow
the United States to assert the good faith and reasonable belief defense
available to the individual defendants under Bivens. In a memoran-
dum written by the Senate Committee on Government Operations,5 in
which the amendment originated, the committee observed:
It is not the intention of this amendment to allow any other defenses
that may be available to individual defendants by state or federal
law, custom or practice to be asserted against the government. Con-
gress does not oppose, however, the assertion of defenses of good
faith and reasonable belief in the validity of the search and arrest on
behalf of individual government defendants, so long as it is under-
stood that the government's liability is not co-terminous with that of
the individual defendants.
56
52. S. REP. No. 93-469, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1973).
53. Id. at 37.
54. 581 F.2d at 396.
55. Senate Comm. on Government Operations, Memorandum on "No-Knock" Legislation
(Aug. 28, 1973) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review). This memorandum is
discussed in Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amend-
ment: An Interpretive Analysis, 54 N.C.L. REv. 497, 514-15 (1976).
56. Senate Comm. on Government Operations, supra note 55, at 5. Based on this memoran-
dum Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 55, concluded:
On one point, however, the Senate committees were clearly insistent on distinguish-
ing their recommendation from prior law. The federal government was not to be al-
lowed to escape liability under the new statute by retreating behind various "defenses"
that had been created under Bivens or section 1983 .... Thus, despite the constant
reference in legislative documents to Bivens and section 1983, the proposed federal liabil-
ity was meant to differ in this very crucial aspect from its historical analogues.
Id. at 515. The court of appeals in Norton was not persuaded by this evidence, however. The
court pointed out that the district court was unable to secure a copy of this memorandum, and
further found it inexplicable that the Senate Committee in its report made no mention of this
memorandum. 581 F.2d at 396 n.1 1. On the contrary, the record indicates a strong reliance on the
memorandum on the part of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. The memoran-
dum preceded, by three months, the publication of Senate Report 93-588 and most of the lan-
guage appearing in the report is taken verbatim from the memorandum. Most important, the
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Moreover, the policy behind allowing the individual employee to
assert the good faith and reasonable belief defense is to protect him
from lawsuits for money damages arising out of the performance of
discretionary duties.-7 Therefore, the good faith and reasonable belief
defense is available to the individual agent only in suits for money
damages." The "good faith defense in a suit for damages brought
against any federal official. . . is not assertable in the face of a request
limited to injunctive, declaratory, or mandamus relief,"59 reflecting that
the belief of the agent regarding the legality of the act does not mitigate
its tortious character. Thus, the policy underlying the availability of
the defense is inapplicable to the Government.
Norton is not the only case that has faced the issue whether the
Government can assert the good faith and reasonable belief of its
agents. Downs v. United Sates,6° a federal district court case, noted the
distinction in the underlying policies in declaring that the Government
is not entitled to assert the individual defenses of its agents in FTCA
actions.6 In recognizing that the origins of qualified individual and
sovereign immunity are distinct, the court concluded that
the application of immunity sought by the Government would
largely emasculate the purposes of the Tort Claims Act; it would be
inconsistent with the Act's waiver of immunity for the Government
to reclaim immunity merely because no action could be brought
against the employee whose act of omission gave rise to a damage
claim.62
As pointed out by a number of cases and commentators, it is indeed
logical that because the rationales for qualified individual immunity
and sovereign immunity are discrete, the two immunities need not ac-
language, set forth in text accompanying note 45 supra, that the court interpreted as evidence of an
intent to limit the liability of the United States under the amendment, originally appeared in the
memorandum. The Senate committee, then, placed great weight on the language in the memoran-
dum, contrary to the conclusion of the appellate court in Norton. Although the specific language
that referred to Congress' explicit intention to disallow the Bivens defense by the Government is
omitted from Senate Report 93-588, it should not be concluded that it was purposefully omitted.
There is certainly sufficient evidence in the report to suggest that the Committee intended to pro-
vide a remedy for citizens who were victims of law enforcement abuses, regardless of the defense
of the individual agent.
57. Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138, 146 (E.D. Va. 1977), res'd, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.
1978).
58. id.
59. National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
accord, Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811, 814 (4th Cir. 1975).
60. 382 F. Supp. 713 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), rev'don other ground&, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975).
61. Id. at 750.
62. Id.
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company one another.63 On the one hand law enforcement officers
should not have to perform their duties with a perpetual fear of civil
lawsuit; on the other, the victims of fourth amendment violations
should not be totally denied compensation when the Government ex-
plicitly admits the constitutional violation. Making the Government
liable even when the agent has a successful defense guarantees com-
pensation for the victim while allowing law enforcement officers to per-
form free of the pressure of civil suit.
The clear intent of Congress in passing the FTCA amendment was
to provide compensation to the innocent victims of unconstitutional
law enforcement activities regardless of the defense of the original
agent.64 Contrary to this intent, the Norton decision, by allowing the
Government to assert the good faith and reasonable belief defense of
its agents, will permit victims of constitutional torts to go without a
remedy when the agent has a successful good faith and reasonable be-
lief defense. Norton has thus preserved the immunity of the United
States for many of the intentional torts committed by its agents, thereby
circumventing the effectiveness of the FTCA amendment. Further-
more, this decision unfortunately departed from the trend to expand
governmental liability in constitutional tort cases and elevates the im-
munity of the United States above the policy of providing compensa-
tion to injured individuals.
DONALD A. KIRKmAN
63. See note 35 supra.
64. See generally Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 55, at 532. This compensatory
interest is represented in S. REP. No. 93-588, supra note 44, at 2-3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2789, 2790 (referring to Collinsville, Illinois raids), as well as in S. REP. No.
93-469, supra note 52, at 36.
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